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On April 22, 1980, in City of Mobile v. Bolden1 the United
States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of at-large elec-
tions for the three-member city commission in Mobile, Alabama.
In so doing, the Court reversed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals that Mobile's at-large plan impermissibly diluted
the electoral influence of black voters in violation of the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments to the Constitution. The Supreme
Court's decision in Bolden [I] emerged from a sharply divided
court. A six-person majority in the case consisted of four jus-
tices-Stewart, Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist-who joined in a
plurality opinion; Justice Stevens, who concurred in the judgment;
and Justice Blackmun, who concurred only in the result. Three
justices-White, Brennan, and Marshall-filed dissenting opinions.
Although the substantive differences among the three opinions
produced by the Court's majority left room for considerable uncer-
tainty regarding the standards for assessing the constitutionality of
local at-large systems, the implications of the Bolden [I] decision
were fairly obvious. Racial or language minority voters alleging
that at-large systems unconstitutionally diluted their electoral in-
fluence faced a more significant evidentiary burden than had previ-
ously existed; one element of this burden was a showing that an at-
large format was created or maintained with racially discrimina-
tory intent by public officials.2
* Research Associate, Institute of Government, Assistant Professor, Woodrow Wilson De-
partment of Government & Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia. B.A., University of Pitts-
burgh, 1970; M.A., Duke University, 1973; Ph.D., Duke University, 1977.
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can Affairs at the University of Virginia for their generous support of this research. The
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1. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as Bolden [I].
2. Id. at 65.
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As the guiding precedent for adjudication of legal challenges to
at-large elections, the Bolden [I] ruling proved to be remarkably
short-lived, as a series of judicial and legislative developments in
the spring and early summer of 1982 seriously undercut the
Court's holding. On April 15, 1982, almost two years to the day
after the Supreme Court's decision in Bolden [I], Judge Virgil
Pittman of the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
Alabama for a second time ruled that at-large elections for the city
commission in Mobile and for the school board in Mobile County
diluted the political power of black voters in violation of the four-
teenth and fifteenth amendments of the Constitution and section 2
of the Voting Rights Act.3
Six years earlier, Judge Pittman's rulings against at-large elec-
tions in suits against the city commission and county school board
had set in motion the trail of litigation leading to the Supreme
Court's Bolden [I], ruling.4 Now, in this new round of opinions,
which followed a second round of trials, Judge Pittman ruled that
at-large elections for the city commission and county school board
had been established with a racially discriminatory purpose, thus
meeting the intent test previously set out by the Supreme Court.5
A little more than two months after Judge Pittman's hew rulings
in the Mobile cases, Congress completed final action on the Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1982;1 and on June 29, 1982, President
Reagan signed this legislation into law. A major provision in this
legislation was a modification of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act;
the new language of section 2 provides that a legal challenge to an
at-large system need not prove intent under the Bolden [I] stan-
dard, but must show only that the system has a discriminatory
impact.7
On July 1, three days after the Voting Rights Act extension be-
came law, the United States Supreme Court for the first time since
Bolden [I], ruled on the merits of a challenge to the constitutional-
ity of a local at-large electoral system, this time involving the elec-
3. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ala. 1982) [hereinafter referred to as
Bolden [111]; Brown v. Board of School Comm'rs, 542 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Ala. 1982), appeal
docketed, No. 82-7130 (11th Cir. Apr. 26, 1982). Judge Pittman also found the at-large sys-
tems to be in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bolden [II], 542 F. Supp. at 1077; Brown, 542 F.
Supp. at 1107.
4. Bolden [I], 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
5. Bolden [II, 542 F. Supp. at 1077.




tion of the Board of Commissioners in Burke County, Georgia. In
Rogers v. Lodge," the Court affirmed the holding of the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals that the at-large system in question diluted
the voting strength of blacks in Burke County in violation of the
fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection. Although
blacks comprise a majority of Burke County's population, no black
had ever been elected to the county commission. Justice White's
opinion for the Court in Lodge implicitly cast doubt on the contin-
uing validity of the Bolden [I] ruling; and, in fact, three members
of the Bolden [I] plurality (Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Ste-
vens) comprised the dissenters in the six-to-three decision in
Lodge.9
The holding in Lodge, when coupled with the recent action of
Congress in amending section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, appeared
to signal a new era in the heretofore sporadically successful litiga-
tion against local at-large electoral systems. Indeed, Justice Ste-
vens' dissent gave special attention to the Court's landmark deci-
sion in Baker v. Carr,10  as if to suggest that a second
reapportionment revolution were in the offing."
Whether the next several years will witness an avalanche of liti-
gation against at-large systems must remain an open question, but
it is clear that the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 and
Lodge have recast the legal foundation of suits against at-large
elections. This article, after presenting a brief overview of the
types of legal challenges to at-large systems, undertakes a review of
the evolution of case law relating to constitutional claims against
at-large systems and of the relationship of the revised section 2 to
that case law. Drawing on this history of case law, the fourth sec-
tion of this article advances a critical view of both the results and
the intent tests as standards against which at-large systems can be
evaluated. Consideration is then given to the theoretical and prac-
tical issues of law raised by the litigation against at-large systems,
with a view toward developing an alternative approach for assess-
ing and remedying the constitutional and statutory infirmities at-
tributed to at-large electoral systems. The final section summarizes
8. - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982).
9. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. at 3281 (Powell, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Ste-
vens also filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 3283 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
11. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. at 3284 (Stevens J., dissenting) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962)).
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the article's major findings and conclusions.
II. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO AT-LARGE ELECTIONS: AN OVERVIEW
A. The Discriminatory Effects of At-Large Elections
Legal activity regarding at-large elections has concentrated on
individual cases-in particular, the unique aspects of a locality's
politics which, in combination with an at-large system, may fore-
close effective minority participation and representation. For ex-
ample, regular bloc voting by white citizens against minority candi-
dates (or minority-supported candidates) can minimize the
influence of minority voters under an at-large format. In this re-
gard, variations in the basic at-large scheme may strongly influence
the relative effectiveness of bloc voting by either white or minority
voters.
In the simplest version of at-large elections, all candidates com-
pete for open seats on the council. If six seats are vacant, the six
candidates receiving the largest number of votes are elected. In cit-
ies using the simple at-large plan, racial minorities often resort to
the tactic of "single-shot" or "bullet ballot" voting in order to win
representation on municipal councils. Single-shot voting refers to
the practice of voting for only one candidate rather than voting,
say, for six candidates for six open seats. The candidate benefiting
from the single-shot tactic is doubly advantaged: he receives a vote
while other candidates are denied a vote. The effectiveness of the
single-shot tactic may be nullified by modifications of the basic at-
large format, such as a requirement that winning candidates must
receive a majority of the ballots cast or a stipulation that a voter
must vote for as many candidates as there are vacancies to be
filled-a "full-slate requirement." A rule providing that candidates
must run for a specific seat or "numbered post" on an at-large
council and staggered terms of office also will reduce the effective-
ness of single-shot voting by minority voters. Alternatively, such
devices enhance the impact of bloc voting by white voters against
minority candidates and, thus, reduce the likelihood of minority
representation. Since the effect of such rules is to increase the min-
imum winning percentage that would otherwise be necessary in a
simple plurality vote, at-large system, one commentator has la-
beled these requirements as "percentage-determining."12
12. Butler, Challenges to Election Structures: Dilution and the Value of the Right to
Vote, 42 LA. L. REv. 851, 864-68 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Butler, Election Structures].
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While provisions requiring majority vote, full-slate voting, num-
bered posts, or staggered terms diminish the possibility of minority
representation in an at-large setting, district residency require-
ments may enhance the responsiveness of at-large systems to mi-
nority interests. A stipulation that a candidate for a specific seat
reside in a particular ward, even though the election is at-large,
may raise the likelihood of minority representation. Viewed from
another angle, a ward residency requirement might be seen as
nothing more than a numbered post requirement in disguise. 13
While at-large schemes clearly vary in their potential for diluting
the political influence of racial or language minorities, a clear pre-
sumption favoring ward-based elections over any form of at-large
system underlies much of the legal activity directed against at-
large systems. This presumption proceeds from the likelihood that
in a given locality a residentially concentrated minority will be able
to control the election of one or more representatives to a local
governing body under a ward-based plan.
B. Routes of Attack: The Voting Rights Act and the
Constitution
Legal challenges to at-large systems fall into two separate, but
related categories: (1) judicial and administrative actions pursuant
to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as severally
amended, and (2) civil suits alleging that at-large elections violate
constitutional guarantees set out in the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments and/or the statutory protection against vote denial or
abridgment under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.14 The first
category involves legal actions that are essentially prophylatic: sec-
13. In evaluating at-large electoral systems, federal courts have tended to view district
residency requirements as mitigating the dilutive impact of at-large elections on minority
interests. See infra text accompanying notes 45, 77-78, 86, 172 and 238. The United States
Department of Justice, within the context of section 5 preclearance, has viewed a residency
rule as a dilutive device and has objected to the adoption of such a requirement in existing
at-large systems. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS
AFTER 209-10 (1975) [hereinafter cited as TEN YEARS AFTER]; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: UNFULFILLED GOALS 5, 97-100 (1982) [hereinafter cited as UNFUL-
FILLED GOALS].
14. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (amended ver-
sion, prior to 1982 amendments, at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1981)). A concise history of the Act is
set out in J. HANUS, P. DOWNING & D. GAY, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1976, As AMENDED:
HISTORY, EFFECTS AND ALTERNATIVES (Cong. Research Serv., Rep. No. 75-243 GGR, rev. Nov.
19, 1975). See generally Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L.
REV. 523 (1973).
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tion 5 provides a mechanism, described in greater detail below,
whereby the United States Attorney General or the federal courts
may block the implementation of potentially discriminatory
changes in electoral laws, such as at-large elections, in state and
local jurisdictions subject to the coverage of section 5. In contrast,
the second category of actions embraces challenges to existing at-
large systems in jurisdictions both within and outside the coverage
of section 5. While constitutional and statutory issues related to
the second category are the principal focus of the present analysis,
appreciation of the application of section 5 to at-large electoral
systems provides a necessary backdrop for the discussion of the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendment cases.
Enacted to guarantee black citizens full rights of suffrage, the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 applied to states and localities, princi-
pally southern, (a) employing voter qualification devices such as
the literacy test and (b) recording voter registration or voter turn-
out under 50 percent of voting age residents in November, 1964.15
The Act suspended voter qualification devices in covered jurisdic-
tions and authorized the appointment of federal examiners to over-
see voter registration in covered areas. Section 5 of the Act re-
quired covered jurisdictions to submit changes in voting laws to
the Attorney General or to the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia for approval.1 6 Congress extended the Act in
1970 and brought under its coverage a few more jurisdictions. 17
The 1975 renewal significantly expanded the scope of the Act to
ensure the voting rights of language minorities (Spanish-heritage,
Indians, Asian-Americans, Alaskan Natives). s A triggering formula
similar to the one contained in the original 1965 Act subjected ar-
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1981).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1981).
17. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. (1981)). An addition to the formula for determining covered juris-
dictions provided that after August 6, 1970, a state or locality would be covered if it main-
tained a test or device on November 1, 1968, and if voter registration or turnout for the
presidential election of 1968 was less than 50 percent. Id. The 1970 amendments also added
section 201 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1981)) which imposed a nationwide ban on the
use of literacy tests. Id. This provision was upheld as a valid exercise of congressional en-
forcement powers under the fifteenth amendment. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
18. Voting Rights Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400. The cover-
age formula was amended to bring in jurisdictions applying a test or device and having
registration or voting rates below 50 percent for the 1972 presidential election. 42 U.S.C. §
1973b(b) (1981). The meaning of test or device was broadened to include English-only elec-
tion materials in jurisdictions where more than 5 percent of the population is of a single
language minority. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(3) (1981).
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eas with a sizable language minority to coverage. These jurisdic-
tions, too, now have to clear changes in voting laws under the pro-
visions of section 5.1 The Voting Rights Act Amendments of
198220 left the existing geographic reach of section 5 intact, but
made substantial modifications in the "bailout" provisions relating
to the conditions under which covered jurisdictions could sue to
escape coverage and thus the requirement of preclearance. 2' The
1982 amendments, as noted, also modified the language of section
2, a broad prohibition against the denial or abridgment of the right
to vote that applies uniformly across the nation.22
At present, all jurisdictions in nine states (Alabama, Alaska, Ari-
zona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and
Virginia) and some jurisdictions in another thirteen states fall
under the preclearance provisions of section 5.23 Having sustained
the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act in a 1966 decision,
the United States Supreme Court, in subsequent rulings, has inter-
preted section 5 permissively to encompass virtually any change in
state or local laws bearing on the conduct of elections.24 Among the
covered changes, requiring either the approval of the Attorney
General or judgment of the District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia, are at-large elections, majority vote provision, full-slate re-
quirement, numbered post provision, staggered terms, redistricting
of wards, and annexation. Any of these changes may encounter the
disapproval of the Attorney General because of their tendency to
dilute the voting strength of a racial or language minority.25
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1981).
20. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982.
21. The revised bailout provisions are discussed in S. REP. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 43-62, 69-75 (1982). See also H.R. REP. No. 97-227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33, 39-42
(1981). See generally Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings].
22. See infra part IV for discussion of section 2.
23. 28 C.F.R. Part 51 app. and Part 55 app. (1982).
24. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966). In Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), the Court
held that section 5 covered virtually all changes in electoral laws. Perkins v. Matthews, 400
U.S. 379 (1971) made municipal annexations subject to preclearance. Georgia v. United
States, 411 U.S. 526 (1972) held that section 5 covered reapportionment. See generally
Thernstrom, The Odd Evolution of the Voting Rights Act, PUB. INTEREST, Spring, 1979, at
49.
25. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 97-417, supra note 21, at 10-14. See also Unfulfilled Goals,
supra note 13, at 64-75. A jurisdiction subject to section 5 preclearance bears the burden of
proving that a change in its electoral laws or practices "'does not have the purpose and will
not have the effect'" of discriminating against minority voters. Beer v. United States, 425
19821
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Challenges to at-large elections under the Voting Rights Act are
limited to jurisdictions covered by the Act and, more narrowly, to
those jurisdictions seeking to make changes in election procedures.
A proposed shift from ward to at-large elections or an attempt to
impose a majority vote requirement on an existing at-large format
probably would fail preclearance by the Justice Department. For
example, the Justice Department denied approval to a 1968 Louisi-
ana statute allowing parish police juries to utilize at-large elections
in place of ward elections formerly required by state law. A review
of section 5 objections to changes relating to the operation of at-
large elections in covered jurisdictions suggests that the Voting
Rights Act has directly affected electoral practices in a number of
localities. Since 1965, the Justice Department has objected to more
than sixty submissions relating to plans of city, county, or special
district governments to change from ward-based to at-large elec-
tions; several of these objections applied to state laws affecting lo-
cal electoral systems generally. In addition, the department inter-
posed objections to well over one hundred submissions relating to
efforts of local governments with at-large election systems in place
to adopt such procedures as numbered posts and majority vote re-
quirements. 26 Undoubtedly, the impact of an objection extends be-
yond the jurisdiction directly affected, exercising a "chilling effect"
on other jurisdictions contemplating a similar change.
Although section 5 does not reach at-large systems already in
existence, the application of section 5 preclearance to municipal
boundary changes provides an indirect means of assault on at-large
elections. When a municipality covered by section 5 undertakes an
otherwise valid annexation that has the effect of reducing the mi-
nority proportion of the population in the enlarged community, as
compared to the pre-annexation community, the municipality may
be required, as a condition of preclearance, to alter its electoral
system so as to ensure minority voters a reasonable opportunity to
elect city councilors in proportion to their political strength in the
newly expanded community. In practice, this approach, which
U.S. 130, 133 (1976) (quoting section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965). Section 5, how-
ever, does not necessarily permit the United States Attorney General to block changes
which, though dilutive of minority strength in an absolute sense, improve minority access
over pre-existing levels. 425 U.S. 130.
26. The data here were drawn from the United States Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Divi-
sion, Complete Listing of Objections pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
(Nov. 30, 1982) (mimeograph). The figures refer to submissions; one submission might, in
fact, include several changes.
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evolved out of litigation involving annexations in Petersburg and
Richmond, Virginia, means this: municipalities with at-large elec-
tions may have to convert to a ward-based or mixed ward/at-large
electoral plan in order to gain Justice Department approval for a
proposed annexation. San Antonio, for example, converted from
at-large to ward elections in 1977 after the Justice Department ob-
jected that a recent annexation diluted the voting strength of Mex-
ican-Americans and blacks.2 8
The application of section 5 to prohibit changes from ward to at-
large elections or, in certain annexation cases, to prohibit the
maintenance of at-large systems has affected the development of
dilution suits in at least three important ways. First, the Voting
Rights Act has created a curious legal dichotomy among covered
jurisdictions. While section 5 prevents local governments with
ward plans from switching to at-large elections, localities with at-
large plans established prior to the effective date of section 5 are
free to maintain them in the absence of a challenge to their consti-
tutionality. Second, the fact that a jurisdiction is under section 5
coverage may influence the judicial determination of the constitu-
tionality of a local at-large plan (a point considered in the follow-
ing sections). In this regard, it should be noted that Congress origi-
nally enacted section 5 in response to a common problem arising
out of voting rights litigation of the late 1950's and early 1960's. If
a civil rights suit successfully challenged one impediment to the
exercise of the right to vote, a jurisdiction might preserve the dis-
criminatory impact of the invalidated device by adopting a new
device. Section 5 was intended to break the chain of noncompli-
ance 9 to prevent a locality, for instance, from responding to black
enfranchisement after the literacy test was eliminated by adopting
at-large elections that minimize the impact of black voters in local
electoral contests. In this respect, many civil rights leaders plainly
regard at-large electoral systems in certain jurisdictions (even
those adopted long before effective black enfranchisement) as the
last refuge of a white majority bent on discrimination against mi-
nority voters.
27. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975); City of Petersburg v. United
States, 410 U.S. 962 (1973), aff'g mem. 354 F. Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1973). See also City of
Port Arthur v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 987 (D.D.C. 1981), afl'd, 51 U.S.L.W. 4033 (U.S.
Dec. 13, 1982).
28. See Cotrell & Stevens, The 1975 Voting Rights Act and San Antonio, Texas: Toward
a Federal Guarantee of a Republican Form of Government, PuBLIUs, Winter, 1978, at 79.
29. See H.R. REP. No. 97-227, supra note 21, at 3-4.
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Finally, attacks on the constitutionality of local at-large
schemes, on occasion, may revert to section 5 disputes. Houston,
Texas, for example, defeated a federal court action challenging the
constitutionality of its at-large system for electing city councilors, 30
only to be forced to abandon the plan in the face of Justice De-
partment objections to the city's annexation proceedings. 1
Although suits asserting the unconstitutionality of at-large elec-
tions can be brought against localities anywhere in the country,
nearly all significant cases have arisen in what until recently was
the Fifth Circuit.32 On October 1, 1981, the Fifth Circuit was split
into a reduced Fifth Circuit consisting of the states of Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas, and a new Eleventh Circuit composed of
Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. The six states that comprised the
old Fifth Circuit are presently covered in whole or in part by the
Voting Rights Act. The old Fifth Circuit emerged as the focal
point for constitutional challenges to at-large elections for two ma-
30. Greater Houston Civic Council v. Mann, 440 F. Supp. 696 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
31. The section 5 action relating to the city's annexations is described in Unfulfilled
Goals, supra note 13, at 54. For the discussion of a similar case involving Shreveport, Loui-
siana, see infra text accompanying notes 198-200.
32. In Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 51 U.S.L.W.
3252 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1982), the court held an at-large election plan for aldermen in West He-
lena, Arkansas, violative of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments and section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. While the city's population was 40 percent black, only three blacks had
won election to the eight-member council since 1920. The at-large plan had both a residency
and numbered post requirement, which the court viewed as significant impediments to black
success in election contests marked by racial bloc voting. Id. at 212-13. The court found
discriminatory intent in the refusal of city council to reconsider a proposed change to a ward
system and in the refusal of the city to reapportion residency wards. Id. at 215. However, in
other dilution cases litigated in the Eighth Circuit, courts have held in favor of the chal-
lenged plans. See Leadership Roundtable v. City of Little Rock, 661 F.2d 701 (8th Cir. 1981)
(per curiam), aff'g 499 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. Ark. 1980), in which a district court dismissed a
challenge to a seven-member city board of directors, elected at-large to numbered positions.
In a 30 percent black city, at least one black and at times two had served on the board in
ten of the last twelve years. 499 F. Supp. at 590. See also Dove v. Moore, 539 F.2d 1152 (8th
Cir. 1976) (rejecting a claim against an at-large councilman plan in Pine Bluff, Arkansas).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a challenge to at-large elections with a ma-
jority vote stipulation for city council in Columbia, South Carolina, even though the city is
35 percent black, and no black had been elected to city council within memory. Washington
v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1981). See also Aranda v. Van Sickle, 600 F.2d 1267 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951 (1980); Black Voters v. McDonough, 565 F.2d 1 (1st
Cir. 1977); Vollin v. Kimbel, 519 F.2d 790 (4th Cir. 1975).
Aside from Perkins, apparently the only successful dilution suits outside the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits have been those actions resolved by consent decrees. E.g., United States v.
Thurston County, No. 78-0-380 (D. Neb. May 9, 1979); United States v. County of San
Juan, No. 79-507 JB (D.N.M. Apr. 8, 1980). See generally House Hearings, supra note 21,
at 2531, 2544-45.
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jor reasons: (1) the presumption that jurisdictions subject to the
Voting Rights Act may use electoral devices, including at-large
elections, for discriminatory purposes since they have done so in
the past; and (2) the receptiveness of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (and more recently the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits) to claims that local at-large elections, under
specific circumstances, are unconstitutional. Federal district and
appellate courts in other circuits have shown a much greater reluc-
tance to entertain claims of dilution.
To date, the number of successful dilution suits remains quite
modest, especially in relation to the hundreds of local governments
within and outside section 5 coverage that employ at-large elec-
tions. It is clear, however, that the cases reported in the Federal
Supplement or Federal Reporter seriously understate the number
of successful actions, since many cases are not published or do not
proceed to trial. A passage from the 1981 House testimony of
Frank R. Parker of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law is revealing in this regard; his written testimony summarized
litigation against at-large elections in Mississippi.
Since 1965, twelve lawsuits have been filed challenging the consti-
tutionality of Mississippi at-large voting systems. In Stewart v. Wal-
ler, the most successful case to date, black voters challenged the
constitutionality of a 1962 Mississippi statute which required all cit-
ies with a mayor-alderman form of government-the most popular
form of government in Mississippi-to elect their aldermen on an
at-large basis. ...
A three-judge District Court in 1975, holding that the Act's provi-
sions were "indicative of an intent to thwart the election of minority
candidates to the office of aldermen" declared the statute unconsti-
tutional "as a purposeful device conceived and operated to further
racial discrimination in the voting process." The District Court,
however, limited its injunction only to those cities and towns which
switched to at-large voting pursuant to the 1962 statute, and refused
to enjoin at-large election systems in effect before 1962, holding that
the constitutionality of these systems would have to be "left for
case-by-case examination."
In the 1977 municipal elections following the District Court's
judgment, 19 black aldermen were elected in ward voting to previ-
ously all-white boards of aldermen in cities and towns covered by
the court's decree.
Individual lawsuits challenging all-at-large systems have been
filed against the cities of Aberdeen, Canton, Columbus, Greenwood,
Greenville, Hattiesburg, Hazelhurst, Jackson, Picayune, West Point,
1982]
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and Yazoo City. Plaintiffs were successful in obtaining injunctions
against at-large voting in the Canton and West Point cases, and Ab-
erdeen, Columbus, Hazelhurst, Picayune, and Yazoo City settled the
cases against them prior to trial and instituted ward voting systems.
In each of the cities which have held city council elections since the
ward voting systems went into effect, black candidates have been
elected. The cities of Jackson, Hattiesburg, Greenwood, and Green-
ville, however, refuse to abolish their at-large voting systems, and
those cases are still in litigation.33
Regardless of the past effects of litigation against at-large sys-
tems in Mississippi and elsewhere, it is apparent that the future
impact of such litigation will depend upon ongoing judicial exposi-
tion of legal principles governing dilution suits. The following sec-
tion reviews the evolution of these principles within the old Fifth
Circuit, the decisions of the Supreme Court in Bolden [I],"' and
Lodge, 5 and congressional efforts to amend section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act 36 to create a statutory basis for challenging at-large
33. House Hearings, supra note 21, at 514 (citing Stewart v. Waller, 404 F. Supp. 206
(N.D. Miss. 1975)) (footnotes omitted).
The Greenwood case noted in the quote is discussed infra at note 141. For a similar re-
view of litigation against at-large systems in Alabama, Georgia, and North Carolina, see
Testimony of Laughlin MacDonald, House Hearings, supra note 21, at 596, 599-607, 610-23,
637-41, 657-83, 695-702, 707-16, 720-34.
Of related interest is a recent survey that sought to determine the extent of efforts to
reform or eliminate at-large systems in southern cities during the 1970's. R.J. Mundt and P.
Heilig, District Representation: Demands and Effects in the Urban South, 44 J. POL. 1035-
48 (1982). Mundt and Heilig gathered data for 209 of 254 southern cities "with populations
over 10,000 which are at least 15 percent black." Id. at 1037. The study found that 175 of
the 209 cities used at-large elections for city council in 1970 and that reform attempts had
occurred in 96 (55 percent) of the 175 cities. Fifty-five cities changed an at-large system to a
ward or mixed ward/at-large plan. The authors of the study go on to note the role of litiga-
tion, presumably based on section 5 of the Voting Rights Act or on the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments.
Sixty-five cities in states within the Fifth Circuit (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Loui-
siana, Mississippi and Texas) established or attempted to establish districts during
the 1970s; 45 percent of these efforts utilized the federal courts. On the other hand,
30 cities in the five southern states not covered by the Fifth Circuit (Arkansas, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia) experienced pro-district move-
ments in the last ten years; of these, only 17 percent involved litigation. However,
even in the Fifth Circuit, referenda have been used more frequently than litigation;
and only half of the suits brought in the Fifth Circuit were successful, compared to
over 78 percent of the referenda.
Id. at 1039-40.
34. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
35. Rogers v. Lodge, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982).
36. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (amended version,
prior to 1982 amendments, at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1981)).
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systems.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF CASE LAW ON AT-LARGE ELECTIONS
A. Zimmer and Its Progeny
From 1973 until 1980, when the Supreme Court ruled on Bolden
[I], the 1973 decision of the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v.
McKeithen3 7 constituted the principal foundation for suits attack-
ing the constitutionality of local at-large elections. While Bolden
[I], cast grave doubt on the logic and evidentiary criteria of Zim-
mer, the Supreme Court's decision in Lodge and congressional ac-
tion in modifying section 2 of the Voting Rights Act have effec-
tively reinstated most of the key elements of the Zimmer ruling.
In Zimmer, black plaintiffs alleged that at-large elections for po-
lice jurors and school board members in a Louisiana parish of
under 13,000 population impermissibly diluted the voting strength
of black residents. The facts of Zimmer make it an odd precedent
for subsequent dilution cases. First, blacks actually constituted a
majority (59 percent) of the parish population, although they ac-
counted for only 46 percent of the registered voters. Second, the
at-large plan under attack had been imposed originally by a dis-
trict court order in 1968 as the remedy for population disparities
among the districts in the ward plan then in use. After the 1970
census, the East Carroll Parish Police Jury resubmitted the at-
large plan to the district court, which approved it. Interestingly,
the 1968 Louisiana statute permitting at-large elections for police
juries and school boards was blocked by the United States Attor-
ney General, acting pursuant to section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act.38
Sidestepping questions about the application of section 5 to the
instant case and the appropriateness of a judicially-created at-large
apportionment plan, the Fifth Circuit took on the issue of uncon-
stitutional dilution. In establishing the standards according to
which dilution might be judged, the court relied upon the opinions
reached by the United States Supreme Court in Whitcomb v.
Chavis39 and White v. Regester. ° Both Whitcomb and White in-
37. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), aff'd, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). The case is ana-
lyzed in Comment, 26 ALA. L. REV. 163 (1973). See also Recent Cases, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1851
(1974).
38. 485 F.2d at 1297.
39. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
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volved claims that multimember districts employed in state legisla-
tive apportionment plans resulted in impermissible dilution of mi-
nority voting strength.41 Whitcomb rejected the contention that
ghetto blacks in Marion County (Indianapolis) suffered a denial of
equal protection because "the number of ghetto residents who
were legislators was not in proportion to ghetto population
.... "42 Both the Democratic and Republican parties regularly
slated black candidates for the legislature, and black under-
representation, in the view of the Whitcomb majority, was attribu-
table to the "defeat at the polls" of the Democratic slate favored
by ghetto voters. The Court thus treated dilution in terms of un-
equal access to the political process, which was not demonstrated
by the facts in Whitcomb, and not in terms of minority under-
representation which had been shown.43 In White, the Supreme
40. 412 U.S. 755 (1973). The development of the doctrine of unconstitutional dilution has
proceeded, with some exceptions to be considered later, primarily within the legal frame-
work established by Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and subsequent reapportion-
ment cases, including Whitcomb and White.
Reynolds held that the guarantee of equal protection in the fourteenth amendment pro-
hibited state legislative apportionment schemes which diluted or debased the votes of indi-
vidual citizens by creating districts of substantially unequal population. Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), extended the "one person, one vote" principle to apportion-
ment plans of local governing bodies.
Local at-large elections, of course, satisfy the "quantitative" requirements of Reynolds
and Avery but may be infirm under "qualitative" standards of equal representation that
come into play after the equal-population mandate has been met. Specifically, federal courts
have considered at-large elections in light of Supreme Court rulings on the use of multi-
member districts in state legislative apportionment schemes. The Reynolds court sanctioned
the use of multimember districts. 377 U.S. at 577, 579. Furthermore, in Bums v. Richard-
son, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), and Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965), the Court approved the
use of multimember districts in specific state legislative apportionment plans. Although
Fortson and Burns recognized the potentially adverse impact of multimember districts on
minority voting strength, the Court found it unnecessary to reach the constitutional ques-
tions posed by such dilution since in neither case had the invidious effects been demon-
strated by the evidence presented. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 124, and White, 412 U.S. at 755,
considered and ruled on the dilution issue with respect to state legislative multimember
districts in Indiana and Texas, respectively.
Good histories of reapportionment litigation are provided by Casper, Apportionment and
the Right to Vote: Standards of Judicial Scrutiny, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Engstrom, Post-
Census Representational Districting; The Supreme Court, "One Person, One Vote," and
the Gerrymandering Issue, 7 S.U.L. REV. 173 (1981); Engstrom, The Supreme Court and
Equipopulous Gerrymandering: A Remaining Obstacle in the Quest for Fair and Effective
Representation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277; Padilla & Gross, Judicial Power and Reapportion-
ment, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 263 (1979); Comment, 5 N. Ky. L. REV. 241 (1978); Annot., 27
A.L.R. FED. 29 (1976 & Supp. 1982).
41. White, 412 U.S. at 756; Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 127.
42. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149.
43. Id. at 141-63.
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Court upheld a district court's findings of dilution in two multi-
member districts created by a Texas legislative apportionment
plan. The practices of a white-dominated slating organization
within the Democratic party largely precluded black participation
in the nomination and election of legislative candidates in Dallas
County. A protracted history of discrimination, particularly with
respect to the franchise, and the unresponsiveness of the legislators
to minority interests combined to deny Mexican-Americans in
Bexar County (San Antonio) equal access to the political process.4 4
The Fifth Circuit read Whitcomb and White to mean that un-
constitutional dilution exists
where a minority can demonstrate a lack of access to the process of
slating candidates, the unresponsiveness of legislators to their par-
ticularized interests, a tenuous state policy underlying the prefer-
ence for multimember or at-large districting, or that the existence of
past discrimination in general precludes the effective participation
in the election system .... Such proof is enhanced by a showing of
the existence of large districts, majority vote requirements, anti-sin-
gle shot voting provisions and the lack of provision for at-large can-
didates running from particular geographical subdistricts. 45
Having set out four primary criteria plus a list of enhancing fac-
tors, the Zimmer court went on to explain that all criteria need not
be satisfied in a successful dilution claim.48 As noted in White, the
"totality of circumstances" confirms the existence of dilution.47 In-
deed, while the court in Zimmer found unconstitutional dilution,
the facts in evidence clearly fulfilled only two of the four primary
criteria, namely the existence of a tenuous state policy and the per-
sistent effects of past discrimination. The record showed no pat-
tern of unresponsiveness by parish officials, nor were blacks un-
equivocably denied political access. Three black candidates for
school board and police jury won election in 1971 and 1972.
The Zimmer case reached the United States Supreme Court in
1976 and, in a per curiam opinion, the Court affirmed Zimmer in
East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall.4s However, the
Court relied upon the procedural rule that federal courts, in devis-
44. White, 412 U.S. at 766-69.
45. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973).
46. 485 F.2d at 1297.
47. White, 412 U.S. at 755.
48. 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
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ing apportionment plans, should employ single-member districts,
absent special circumstances which would justify the use of multi-
member districts. In so doing, the Court specifically dissociated it-
self from the constitutional views expressed in Zimmer.49
Although East Carroll Parish cast some doubt on the value of
Zimmer as precedent, the Zimmer criteria continued to govern the
adjudication of dilution challenges in the Fifth Circuit. However, a
dilution case involving at-large elections for city commissioners in
Albany, Georgia, produced a different constitutional foundation for
dilution claims. No black candidate had won a seat on the city
commission over the period 1947 to 1975, despite the fact that
blacks accounted for 39 percent of Albany's population of 76,000.
The creation of the at-large scheme dated to a 1947 Georgia law
which was enacted shortly after the demise of all-white primaries
and the 1946 election in one ward of a white candidate who en-
joyed black support. State legislation enacted in 1959 added a ma-
jority vote requirement." Relying on Gomillion v. Lightfoot,51 the
federal district court, in Paige v. Gray5" judged the 1947 act estab-
lishing the at-large system to be an unconstitutional abridgment of
the right to vote under the fifteenth amendment; the court substi-
tuted a mixed plan calling for five commissioners elected by wards
and a mayor and mayor pro tem elected at large.5
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
district court in light of its reliance on Gomillion and its adoption
of a mixed plan.5" The Fifth Circuit panel chastized the district
court for its failure to apply "more recent Fourteenth Amendment
precedents,"55 specifically White and Zimmer; further, the panel
noted that in cases of dilution, "Zimmer sets the basic standard in
this circuit. ' 56 On remand, the district court made the appropriate
49. Id. at 638.
50. Paige v. Gray, 399 F. Supp. 459 (M.D. Ga. 1975), vacated and remanded, 538 F.2d
1108 (5th Cir. 1976).
51. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). Gomillion dealt with the gerrymandering of the boundaries of
Tuskegee, Alabama, in order to fence out black voters; the Court recognized the challenge to
the plan as a valid fifteenth amendment claim. Id.
52. 399 F. Supp. 459.
53. Id. For an analysis of Paige and the Gomillion precedent, see Bonapfel, Minority
Challenges to At-Large Elections: The Dilution Problem, 10 GA. L. REv. 353, 362-65 (1976).
54. Paige, 538 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1976).
55. Id. at 1110.
56. Id. at 1111. The Supreme Court had previously stated that "there is no decision in
this Court holding a legislative apportionment or reapportionment violative of the Fifteenth
Amendment." Beer v. United Sates, 425 U.S. 130, 142 n.14 (1976).
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findings of fact required by Zimmer but refused to recognize the
validity of Zimmer as precedent. Instead, the court specifically fol-
lowed Whitcomb and White in finding unconstitutional dilution
under the fourteenth amendment and reiterated the finding of a
fifteenth amendment violation in the 1947 act.57
The reluctance of the court of appeals in Paige to rely on
fifteenth amendment precedents in deciding the Albany case ap-
parently derived from its view that such a rationale would require
a showing of "racial motivation" in the enactment of the plan. 8
The Fifth Circuit regarded the fourteenth amendment reappor-
tionment cases, from which Zimmer descended, as sounder prece-
dent. 9 The court's view implicitly underlined the reading that re-
apportionment cases in general, and dilution cases in particular,
required only a demonstration of discriminatory effect in the oper-
ation of the challenged plan.
Paige in two respects foreshadowed subsequent developments in
the law regarding at-large elections. First, the Fifth Circuit, in light
of the Supreme Court's subsequent ruling in Bolden [I], correctly
assessed the tenuous fifteenth amendment foundation of dilution
suits. Second, the Fifth Circuit's concern with the intent question
pointed to what in future dilution cases would become a dominant
issue, but the circuit court's avoidance of an intent standard in
57. Paige v. Gray, 437 F. Supp. 137, 145-46 n.5 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (remedy of six ward
councilors and a mayor elected at-large).
58. 538 F.2d at 1111. See also Bonapfel, supra note 53, at 364.
59. See infra note 64. Among the successful challenges to at-large elections predicated on
Zimmer (apart from those discussed in the text) are several which merit summary. In Aus-
berry v. City of Monroe, 456 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. La. 1978), Judge Dawkins struck down the
at-large election of a three-member commission in a city of over 56,000 people, roughly 38
percent of whom were black. The at-large election of county commissioners in Montgomery
County, Alabama, fell in Hendrix v. McKinney, 460 F. Supp. 626 (M.D. Ala. 1978). The
county's population of nearly 168,000 is 36 percent black. The at-large plan in effect dated
to 1957 when the state legislature, anticipating the potential-impact of the Civil Rights Act
of 1957, abandoned a district format in place for fifty years.
In at least three reported dilution cases, defendant public officials conceded the unconsti-
tutionality of the contested at-large plans at some point in the litigation. Two cases con-
cerned Louisiana municipalities in which blacks constituted a majority in the population
and a minority of registered voters; in neither city had a black been elected to the governing
council under the existing at-large format. See Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619 (5th Cir.
1975) (involving the town of Ferriday); Perry v. City of Opelousas, 515 F.2d 639 (5th Cir.
1975) (the companion case). For later action in Wallace, with regard to the remedy, see
Wallace v. House, 538 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1976). The third suit attacked the at-large elec-
tion of trustees for the Waco, Texas, Independent School District, the population of which
was 19.4 percent black and 8.7 percent Mexican-American. Calderon v. McGee, 584 F.2d 66
(5th Cir. 1978).
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Paige failed to anticipate the impending shift in the principles gov-
erning dilution actions.
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals itself undertook a
major reinterpretation of this position on March 29, 1978, when a
panel of the court decided four dilution cases, including the Mobile
case. In the lead case, Nevett v. Sides,60 the panel applied Wash-
ington v. Davis,"' a 1976 Supreme Court decision dealing with dis-
crimination in employment, and Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,6' a 1977 Supreme
Court ruling on exclusionary zoning, to dilution claims based on
the fourteenth amendment. Such claims, according to the panel,
require a demonstration of "racial intent" in the creation or main-
tenance of the challenged plan. 3
The addition of a required showing of intent to the Zimmer cri-
teria might have transformed the nature of dilution claims,64 for
Zimmer had disavowed a concern for intent, emphasizing instead
an interest in the effects of a challenged apportionment plan on
the voting strength of a minority element.6 5 Intent could be easily
discerned in a case such as that involving Albany, where the adop-
tion of at-large elections had occurred fairly recently and in re-
sponse to rising levels of black voter participation. In other cases,
however, a showing of intent would require a demonstration that
an at-large plan adopted under race-neutral circumstances was
maintained by legislative inaction for discriminatory purposes.6 6
The panel in Nevett 11 overcame the potential for chaos in a stan-
dard of intent by holding that "the Zimmer criteria provide a fac-
tual basis from which the necessary intent may be inferred. '6 7 It
proceeded to affirm a district court's rejection of a suit alleging di-
60. 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Nevett II]. In an earlier version of
this case, the court of appeals reversed a judgment for the plaintiffs because the district
court had failed to apply the Zimmer criteria. 533 F.2d 1361 (5th Cir. 1976). See Note,
Racial Vote Dilution in Multimember Districts: The Constitutional Standard After Wash-
ington v. Davis, 76 MICH. L. REV. 694 (1978); Comment, 30 ALA. L. REV. 396 (1979).
61. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
62. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
63. Nevett II, 571 F.2d at 209.
64. Judge Wisdom opined that neither Washington nor Arlington Heights imposed an
intent standard in dilution cases because voting rights disputes are distinguishable from
other equal protection cases. Nevett II, 571 F.2d at 231 (Wisdom, J., concurring).
65. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1304 n.16 (5th Cir. 1973). See also Comment,
26 ALA. L. REV. 163 (1973).
66. Nevett II, 571 F.2d at 209, 232 (Wisdom, J., concurring). See also Comment, 9 CuM.
L. REV. 443, 451-52 (1978).
67. Nevett 11, 571 F.2d at 223.
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lution in the at-large election of aldermen in Fairfield, Alabama.
The Nevett H panel found the record ambiguous on virtually all
counts of the primary criteria of Zimmer. Blacks made up 50 per-
cent of the registered voters in Fairfield (a city of just over 14,000
population). In 1968, blacks won six of twelve aldermanic seats and
none in 1972, the latter result attributable to the failure of black
voters to turn out in that election."8
On the same day that the Fifth Circuit court ruled on the Fair-
field case, it decided three other dilution cases on the basis of the
evidentiary standards set out in Nevett I. In Blacks United for
Lasting Leadership, Inc. v. City of Shreveport,"9 the court re-
versed and remanded for further findings of fact a district court
ruling that the at-large election of a five-member city commission
impermissibly diluted minority voting strength. In a second case,
Thomasville Branch of NAACP v. Thomas County,70 the court
overturned a district court's dismissal of a suit against an at-large
electoral system for the commission of Thomas County, Georgia,
and remanded the case for trial. The district court had dismissed
the complaint on the grounds that minority plaintiffs had not
shown that the at-large system had been established with discrimi-
natory intent; the Fifth Circuit court held that plaintiffs needed to
show only that the system was maintained with invidious motive in
order to prove their claim of dilution.7
The third case decided along with Nevett II was Bolden v. City
of Mobile (Bolden [IJ]);72 the Fifth Circuit's affirmance of the dis-
trict court's finding of unconstitutional dilution in the at-large
election of Mobile's city commission led to the Supreme Court's
1980 ruling in Bolden [I].73 In view of the importance attached to
this litigation by virtue of the Supreme Court's consideration of
the case, the holdings of the district court and Fifth Circuit merit
more than cursory discussion.
B. The Mobile Cases
The district court's opinion in Bolden [IF4 noted in particular
68. Id. at 226-27.
69. 571 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1978).
70. 571 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
71. Regarding further action in this case, see infra note 141.
72. 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd and remanded, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
73. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
74. Bolden [I], 423 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
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the inability of blacks to participate fully in the political pro-
cess-the first criterion under Zimmer. While blacks made up
35.4 percent of the city's population of 190,026, no blacks had ever
been elected to the three-member commission; and few had run.
The district court noted a pattern of racially polarized voting and
a climate in which seeking the support of black voters could be
politically hazardous.
One city commissioner, Joseph N. Langan, who served from 1953 to
1969, had been elected and reelected with black support until the
1965 Voting Rights Act enfranchised large numbers of blacks. His
reelection campaign in 1969 foundered mainly because of the fact of
the backlash from the black support .... He was again defeated in
an at-large county commission race in 1972. Again the backlash be-
cause of the black support substantially contributed to his defeat.7 6
The district court found the city commissioners unresponsive to
the interests of the black minority. For example, blacks held only
47 of the 482 positions on 46 city committees; and of the 435 em-
ployees in the fire department, only 15 were black. The court
found street maintenance in black neighborhoods to be inferior to
that in white neighborhoods. Under the third of the Zimmer crite-
ria, tenuous state policy, the district court noted the longstanding
commitment of the city to at-large elections, dating back to 1911.
Despite the removal of barriers to registration and voting, blacks
still suffered from the effects of past discrimination, one bit of evi-
dence in this regard being the persistence of white bloc voting. En-
hancing factors noted under the Zimmer criteria included not only
a majority vote and a place requirement, but also the absence of a
subdistrict residency requirement and the large size of the city.
The district court, declaring the existing at-large scheme unconsti-
tutional, ordered the establishment of a strong mayor-council plan,
with nine councilors to be elected from wards, in place of the com-
mission plan.77
In its treatment of the case on appeal, a panel of the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals gave special attention to the city's claim that
the enactment of the at-large plan in 1911 insulated it from attack
as racially motivated.7 8 The panel, following Nevett II, reiterated
75. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973).
76. Bolden [I], 423 F. Supp. at 388.
77. 423 F. Supp. 384.
78. Bolden [I, 571 F.2d 238, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1978).
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that intent could be inferred from the Zimmer criteria and, in ad-
dition, cited some direct evidence of intent in the maintenance of
the at-large plan. In particular, the panel noted a 1965 act of the
Alabama legislature that assigned specific duties to each position
on the commission. The city sought preclearance for the act under
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act ten years later-after the dilu-
tion litigation began. The Attorney General, seeing the modifica-
tion as an effort to enhance the impact of the at-large system in
diluting minority voting strength, rejected the change in 1976.71 Fi-
nally, the panel approved the district court's unusual remedy and,
in doing so, observed the city's refusal to offer a plan of its own.80
While the suit against Mobile's city commission worked its way
through the district and appellate courts, black voters brought a
parallel action against at-large elections of county and school com-
missioners.81 The suit against the county was tried several weeks
after the one against the city, by the same judge. The district court
in separate opinions found the at-large election of the three-mem-
ber county commission82 and the five-member school commission"
to be unconstitutional, and in each instance ordered the implemen-
tation of a plan for single-member districts. The county commis-
sion did not appeal the ruling against its at-large system, whereas
the school commissioners appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which af-
firmed the district court's decision without issuing a formal
opinion.84
The findings in the district court's opinion in the Mobile County
School Board case8 5 closely resembled those in the case against the
city. The five-member board was elected at-large to numbered po-
sitions; a majority vote rule applied to the primary election only,
and no district residency rule existed. The judge also observed that
the large size of the county-its population exceeded 317,000-was
a barrier to minority candidacies.8 " Although blacks comprised
79. Id.
80. Id. at 246-47.
81. Brown v. Moore, 428 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd, 582 F.2d 927 (5th Cir.
1978), vacated and remanded, sub nom. Williams v. Brown, 446 U.S. 236 (1980) (per
curiam).
82. Brown v. Board of School Comm'rs, No. 75-298 P (S.D. Ala. Mar. 2, 1977).
83. Brown v. Moore, 428 F. Supp. 1123.
84. Brown v. Moore, 582 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1978).
85. 428 F. Supp. 1123.
86. This finding was made by the !district court in Bolden [I], 423 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Ala.
1976), and was adopted by the court in Brown v. Moore, 428 F. Supp. at 1126.
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one-third of the county's population, no black had been elected to
the board and voting patterns were strongly polarized along racial
lines. The board's discriminatory employment policies and resis-
tance to court ordered desegregation of the school system demon-
strated unresponsiveness and also illustrated the continuing effects
of past discrimination. The school board's at-large plan originated
in 1826, and the court found no tenuous state policy behind the at-
large elections.87
The school board case was then appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, under the name Williams v. Brown,88 and consoli-
dated for oral argument with the city's appeal of Bolden [I].9 On
the same day that the Supreme Court issued its controversial rul-
ing in Bolden [I], it vacated the lower court's holding in Brown
and remanded the school board suit for reconsideration in light of
its decision in the city's case °0
In Bolden [I], Justice Stewart's plurality opinion assessed the
grounds on which a dilution claim could be made out. Appellees
claimed that Mobile's election system violated the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The
plurality view held that under a claim of dilution-whether predi-
cated on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
or on the fifteenth amendment's prohibition against racial discrim-
ination against the exercise of the right to vote9l-"an illicit pur-
pose must be proved before a constitutional violation can be
found.""2 The plurality dismissed the fifteenth amendment and
section 2 claims, first finding that section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act had "an effect no different from that of the fifteenth amend-
87. 428 F. Supp. at 1126-32.
88. 446 U.S. 236 (1980) (per curiam).
89. City of Mobile v. Bolden [I], 446 U.S. 55 (1979).
90. 446 U.S. 236. Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall dissented; Justice Blackmun
concurred in the vacation of the judgment but noted that he would have affirmed the judg-
ment of the court of appeals had the case been decided on its merits. Even though the
judgment against the school board had been vacated, the district court's order for single-
member districts continued to be implemented, at least through the 1980 elections. (The
election of members for ward seats was to be phased in so that two persons would be elected
in 1978, one in 1980, and two more in 1982.) In Moore v. Brown, 448 U.S. 1335 (Powell,
Circuit Justice, 1980), Justice Powell denied an application for a stay of the district court's
preliminary injunction mandating that the 1980 election be held under the ward plan as
scheduled. He was, however, openly critical of the district court's action.
91. Bolden [I], 446 U.S. at 62.
92. Id. at 67 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Wright v. Rockefeller,
376 U.S. 52 (1964)).
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ment itself"'93 and therefore "add[ed] nothing to appellees'
fifteenth amendment claim." 94 But, because the district court
found that "Negroes in Mobile 'register and vote without hin-
drance,' 95 there was no proof of "purposefully discriminatory de-
nial or abridgment by government of the freedom to vote 'on ac-
count of race, color, or previous condition of servitude' "96 and thus
no fifteenth amendment violation.
Having restricted the dilution issue to fourteenth amendment
grounds, the plurality proceeded to launch a frontal assault on the
Zimmer factors that had governed the lower courts' consideration
of the case. These factors might "afford some evidence of a dis-
criminatory purpose, [but] were most assuredly insufficient to
prove an unconstitutionally discriminatory purpose in the present
case." 17 Justice Stewart's opinion noted with regard to the first
Zimmer factor-access to the political process-that there were no
official barriers to black candidates running for election to the city
commission. 98 On the factor of responsiveness to the interests of
the black minority,99 the plurality view suggested that discrimina-
tion in municipal employment and services constituted only "the
most tenuous and circumstantial evidence of the constitutional in-
validity of the electoral system under which [the commissioners]
attained their offices."' 00 The plurality also minimized the signifi-
cance of Mobile's record of past discrimination in evaluating the
impact of the current at-large system.101
The principal weakness in the district court's opinion, according
to the plurality, was its failure to undertake a systematic investiga-
tion of official discriminatory intent in the creation or maintenance
of the at-large system. Indeed, the district court did not "identify
the state officials whose intent it considered relevant";102 and Jus-
tice Stewart wondered whether "the inquiry should properly focus
on the state legislature."' 0 3 Relying on Personnel Administrator v.
93. 446 U.S. at 61.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 65.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 73.
98. Id. at 74.
99. See supra text accompanying note 77.
100. Bolden [I], 446 U.S. at 74.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 74 n.20.
103. Id. at 74 nn.20 & 21.
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Feeney,10 4 the plurality maintained that intent amounted to more
than "awareness of consequences"; a showing of intent would re-
quire that the at-large system was chosen "because of" its adverse
impact on blacks. 10 5 Thus, they specifically rejected the district
court's contention that the state legislature, in creating the at-large
system in 1911 when most blacks were prevented from voting,
could have anticipated that blacks would one day be enfrancised
and that at-large elections would limit their influence.108
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Bolden [IP0 7 rejected
both the Zimmer standards of the lower courts and the intent test
of the plurality. In his view, virtually all districting arrangements
advantaged some segments of the population and disadvantaged
others. All groups of voters, whether classified according to racial
or political characteristics, are entitled to the same degree of pro-
tection under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. Therefore,
defining dilution in terms of impact or intent would involve the
courts in the supervision of countless electoral systems because dif-
ferential effect or invidious motive will almost always be present.10 8
Justice Stevens, therefore, proposed to limit judicial intervention
to those instances in which a gerrymander or at-large election was
clearly not the result of a "routine" political decision, but "had a
significant adverse impact on a minority group... [and] was un-
supported by any neutral justification." ' While he believed that
Mobile's at-large system received support "from members of the
white majority who are motivated by a desire to make it more diffi-
cult for members of the black minority to serve in positions of re-
sponsibility in city government,"11  he asserted that such an invidi-
ous motive could not invalidate a system which represented
"otherwise legitimate political choices." ' Justice Stevens noted
that "Mobile's basic election system is the same as that followed
by literally thousands" 112 of local governments.
Joining Justice Stevens and the four-member plurality to form
the six-man majority in Bolden [I], Justice Blackmun concurred
104. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
105. Bolden [I], 446 U.S. at 71-72 n.17.
106. Id. See Bolden [I], 423 F. Supp. 384, 397 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
107. 446 U.S. at 83 (Stevens, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 90.
109. Id.





only in the result of the case. 113 Agreeing with Justice White that
Mobile's at-large system invidiously discriminated against black
voters, Justice Blackmun voted to reverse the lower court's judg-
ment because of what he regarded as an extraordinary abuse of
remedial discretion by the district court in disestablishing Mobile's
city commission." 4
Justice White's dissenting opinion in Bolden [I], in contrast to
the opinions of the plurality and Justice Stevens, found the lower
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law to be wholly consis-
tent with previous Supreme Court rulings.115 The so-called Zimmer
criteria, in Justice White's view, accurately catalog the evidentiary
findings set out in White"l1 and Whitcomb.117 Moreover, the court
of appeals, following Washington""" and Arlington Heights,"9 had
correctly observed that successful dilution claims require a showing
of intent.2 0 Such intent could be properly inferred from the total-
ity of circumstances revealed through the Zimmer analysis.' 2' The
evidence of purposeful discrimination in Bolden [I] was "even
more compelling" than in White, and more than sufficient to es-
tablish a violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. 122
Both Justices Brennan and Marshall, who filed separate dissent-
ing opinions, agreed with Justice White that discriminatory intent
had been adequately demonstrated in Bolden [I].123 Neither Jus-
tice Brennan nor Justice Marshall, however, believed that a show-
ing of intent was necessary; for each, proof of discriminatory im-
pact was sufficient to render an at-large system unconstitutional.2 4
113. Id. at 80 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 82.
115. Id. at 94 (White, J., dissenting).
116. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973). In White, the Court unanimously held that
the use of multimember districts for the election of state legislators in two Texas counties
violated the equal protection clause because they excluded Negroes and Mexican-Americans
from effective political participation. Id.
117. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), recognized that multimember districting
schemes could constitute invidious discrimination "where the circumstances ... may 'oper-
ate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting
population.'" Id. at 143 (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)).
118. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
119. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
120. Bolden [I], 446 U.S. 55, 100 (1979).
121. Id. at 101-02 (White, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 103.
123. Id. at 94 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 94 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 103 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 94 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 104 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1982]
64 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Justice Marshall's lengthy dissent tied vote dilution cases to the
branch of equal protection law dealing with fundamental
rights-in Bolden [I], the "right to equal electoral participa-
tion."' 25 In such fundamental rights cases, only discriminatory im-
pact is required in order to show a constitutional violation. In con-
trast, a showing of intent would be required under the suspect
classification branch of equal protection cases, of which Washing-
ton was an example. Thus, according to Justice Marshall, the plu-
rality had applied the wrong standard to the evaluation of Mobile's
at-large system and in the process had misinterpreted White,28
threatening to convert the right of minority group members to vote
into "the right to cast meaningless ballots.' 1 27 Dismissing the con-
tention of the plurality that his views amounted to an endorsement
of proportional representation, Justice Marshall proposed a test of
dilution applicable to discrimination against racial or political
groups-but circumstantially more likely to apply to racial minori-
ties. "The vote-dilution doctrine can logically apply only to groups
whose electoral discreteness and insularity allow dominant political
factions to ignore them.'"'2 Thus, he noted:
Unconstitutional vote dilution occurs only when a discrete politi-
cal minority whose voting strength is diminished by a districting
scheme proves that historical and social factors render it largely in-
capable of effectively utilizing alternative avenues of influencing
public policy .... In these circumstances, the only means of break-
ing down the barriers encasing the political arena is to structure the
electoral districting so that the minority has a fair opportunity to
elect candidates of its choice.
The test for unconstitutional vote dilution, then, looks only to the
discriminatory effects of the combination of an electoral structure
and historical and social factors. At the same time, it requires elec-
toral minorities to prove far more than mere lack of success at the
polls. 29
Although only Justice Brennan clearly embraced Justice Mar-
shall's argument for an effects analysis of dilution cases, the re-
maining justices hardly offered crystal clear support for an intent
test. Justice Blackmun hedged on the question of whether a show-
125. Id. at 113-14 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 114.
127. Id. at 104.
128. Id. at 122.
129. Id. at 111-12 n.7.
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ing of intent was required, while Justice Stevens, as noted, ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with both the intent and effects tests. Jus-
tice White accepted the plurality's view that intent was a necessary
element in successful dilution cases, but rejected the plurality's ev-
identiary requirements for intent.
The Bolden [I] decision also spawned some confusion regarding
the legal foundation of dilution claims. While the plurality opined
that Bolden [I] did not raise a fifteenth amendment claim, three
justices (Stevens, White, and Marshall) asserted that the case
properly raised a fifteenth amendment claim.130 Justices Blackmun
and Brennan failed to address the issue of the application of the
fifteenth amendment. The plurality, along with Justice Marshall,
read section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as coterminous with the
fifteenth amendment but, of course, differed over what relevance
either section 2 or the fifteenth amendment might have for dilu-
tion cases;'3 1 the other three justices did not speak to the section 2
issue.
Although the Supreme Court's split decision in Bolden [I] left
several important issues unresolved, on balance the Court's holding
seemed to call for a showing of intentional discrimination in the
creation or maintenance of an at-large system amounting to more
than an inference from the aggregate of Zimmer factors. The pre-
cise impact of Bolden [I] on the course of dilution suits cannot be
assessed solely by scanning the legal opinions of cases decided af-
ter the Supreme Court's decision. According to the Senate Judici-
ary Committee's Report on the 1982 Voting Rights Act Extension,
"after Bolden [I] litigators virtually stopped filing new voting dilu-
tion cases. Moreover, the decision had a direct impact on voting
dilution cases that were making their way through the federal judi-
cial system."132 As evidence of the drastic change worked by
Bolden [I], the Committee cited McCain v. Lybrand, 33 a case in-
volving a challenge to at-large election of a five-member council in
Edgefield County, South Carolina. Although blacks comprised a
slight majority of Edgefield County's population and nearly 40 per-
130. Id. at 129 n.26.
131. Id. at 105 n.2. See Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 913, 919 n.3 (4th Cir. 1981). See
also Comment, The Standard of Proof in At-Large Vote Dilution Discrimination Cases
After City of Mobile v. Bolden, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 103, 113-14 nn.38-41 (1981).
132. S. REP. No. 97-417, supra note 21, at 26.
133. No. 74-281 (D.S.C. Apr. 17, 1980), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 21, at
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cent of registered voters, no black had ever been elected to the
council and the district court, applying the criteria of White and
Zimmer, found the at-large form unconstitutional. Less than one
week after the district court's decision, the Supreme Court ruled in
Bolden [I]; and the district court subsequently reversed its earlier
opinion, finding that the at-large plan in Edgefield County was not
rooted in intentional discrimination.13 4
Beyond McCain, the effects of Bolden [I] on ongoing litigation
against at-large systems are more difficult to sort out. Minority
plaintiffs, for instance, have succeeded in so-called "smoking
gun,135 cases, where specific evidence of racially discriminatory
motive was at hand. In McMillan v. Escambia County,36 a suit in
Florida against at-large elections for Pensacola city council and for
Escambia County commissioners and school board members, the
facts followed the pattern of the Albany, Georgia, litigation de-
scribed earlier, 3 7 where the adoption of at-large elections followed
closely in time a significant expansion of black voting strength. In
another case, Perkins v. City of West Helena,"3 s the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals adduced direct evidence of discriminatory intent
in the circumstances surrounding the failure of city council to pro-
ceed with a referendum on a ward electoral system.
In still another case, Lodge v. Buxton,"5 9 the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling against an at-large
electoral system in Burke County, Georgia. Unlike the McMillan
and Perkins cases, Lodge presented no direct evidence of intent;
instead, the district court, following Nevett 11,140 had inferred in-
tent from factual findings relating to the Zimmer criteria. The
Lodge ruling, however, seemed to be an exception to the rule that
specific evidence of intent had to be provided in a successful dilu-
134. McCain v. Lybrand, No. 74-281 (D.S.C. Aug. 11, 1980), reprinted in House Hearings,
supra note 21, at 302. In the August 11, 1980, order, the district court simply vacated its
April 17, 1980, ruling; however, the last page of the April 17, 1980, ruling was inadvertently
printed in the House Hearings. See House Hearings, supra note 21, at 325-26.
135. For specific reference to "smoking gun"-a legacy of the Watergate era, see Lodge v.
Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1363 n.8 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Rogers v. Lodge, - U.S.
-, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982); S. REP. No. 97-417, supra note 21, at 38.
136. 638 F.2d 1239, appeal dismissed under Rule 53, sub nom. City of Pensacola v. Jen-
kins, 453 U.S. 946, vacated, 688 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1981).
137. See supra text accompanying note 50.
138. 675 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982). See supra note 32.
139. 639 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1981), afl'd sub noma. Rogers v. Lodge, - U.S. _, 102 S. Ct.
3272 (1982).
140. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978).
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tion case.141
C. Congress and Section 2
While Bolden [I] did not foreclose vote dilution suits altogether,
the ruling undoubtedly made success in such actions much less
likely and, equally important, as Judge Goldberg of the Fifth Cir-
cuit rather bitterly suggested, "[cast] aside the ten years of
thought, experience, and struggle embodied within [the Zimmer
test]. 142 What Judge Goldberg called the "jurisprudence produced
by ten years of struggle and compromise, 1 43 however, was resur-
rected when the Ninety-seventh Congress, in enacting the Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1982, modified section 2 of the Act in
order "to restore the pre-Bolden [I] understanding of the proper
141. On the same day (March 20, 1981) that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided
Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, it decided two other dilution cases. In Cross v. Baxter, 639
F.2d 1383 (1981), aff'd on rehearing, 688 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1982), the court affirmed a
district court's rejection of a dilution claim against the at-large election of the city council in
Moultrie, Georgia. (Blacks made up about 35 percent of the city's population and 26 percent
of its registered voters). In the late 1970's one seat on the six-member council had been won
by two different blacks in consecutive elections. See Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875 (1979),
aff'd, 639 F.2d 1383 (1981), aff'd on rehearing, 688 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1982), in which the
court in 1979 reversed and remanded the district court's original dismissal of this suit. A
majority vote requirement applicable to city elections was eliminated by a three-judge dis-
trict court in 1977. Id. at 878 n.1. In Thomasville Branch of NAACP v. Thomas County, 639
F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. 1981), the court reversed and remanded for reconsideration in light of
Lodge a district court judgment for the defendant county. See supra text accompanying
notes 70-71.
In Corder v. Kirksey, 639 F.2d 1191 (5th Cir. 1981), decided four days before Lodge, the
court affirmed a lower court ruling in favor of the county commission in Pickens County,
Alabama.
In Bailey v. Vining, 514 F. Supp. 452 (M.D. Ga. 1981), a district court relied heavily on
the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Lodge in striking down at-large elections for the county commis-
sion and the board of education in Putnam County, Georgia. The court also invalidated a
mixed ward/at-large system in the city of Eatonton, located within Putnam County; the
mixed plan had been adopted in order to forestall the dilution suit. A numbered post and
majority vote requirement applied to commission and school board elections, while a major-
ity vote requirement applied to city elections (a post requirement covered the city's at-large
seats). Id. at 457-58. Blacks comprised about 56 percent of the city's population and about
half of the county's population. Id. at 454. However, "blacks have lost every opposed at-
large election in this century." Id. at 455. See also Jordan v. City of Greenwood, 534 F.
Supp. 1351 (N.D. Miss. 1982), in which the district court, following the Supreme Court's
holding in Bolden [II, rejected a challenge to a three-member commission elected at-large
with a number post requirement and a majority vote rule in the primary. Although the city's
population was 52 percent black in 1980, no black had ever been elected to the commission
since its creation in 1914.
142. Jones v. City of Lubbock, 640 F.2d 777, 777 (1981) (per curiam) (Goldberg, J., spe-
cially concurring), aff'd on rehearing, 682 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1982). For further action in this
case, see infra note 230.
143. 640 F.2d at 777.
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legal standard' ' 44 for assessing dilution claims.
Although the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights
of the House Judiciary Committee in seven weeks of hearings on
the Voting Rights Act extension devoted only one day of testimony
to the question of amending section 2, the parent Judiciary
Committee on September 15, 1981, reported out a bill that, among
other provisions, inserted a so-called "results test" in the language
of section 2. The text of that section, with new language proposed
by the House Judiciary Committee in italics and proposed dele-
tions in brackets, is as follows:
Sec. 2. No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision [to deny or abridge] in a manner which results
in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2). The fact that members of a
minority group have not been elected in numbers equal to the
group's proportion of the population shall not, in and of itself, con-
stitute a violation of this section.146
The House of Representatives approved the revised language of
section 2 on October 5, 1982, when it passed H.R. 3112, amending
and extending the Voting Rights Act. While revision of section 2
occasioned little debate either in committee or on the floor in the
House, the question of whether to amend section 2 dominated
hearings in the upper chamber on the Voting Rights Act held dur-
ing the first two months of 1982 by the Subcommittee on the Con-
stitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The Subcommittee
reported out a version of the Voting Rights Act extension that re-
tained the existing language of section 2.147 In so doing, the Sub-
144. H.R. REP. No. 97-227, supra note 21, at 29. Comparable language appears in S. REP.
No. 97-417, supra note 21, at 27.
145. H.R. REP. No. 97-227, supra note 21, at 71 (dissenting views of the Hon. Caldwell
Butler). This portrayal is disputed in S. REP. No. 97-417, supra note 21, at 27 n.107, which
states that "some 30 witnesses" addressed the section 2 issue during the House Hearings.
146. H.R. REP. No. 97-227, supra note 21, at 48. Section 4(f)(2) defines the protection
accorded language minorities. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73,
§4(f)(2), 89 Stat. 400, 401 (amended version, prior to 1982 amendments at 42 U.S.C. §
1973b(f)(2) (1981).
147. SUBCOMM. ON THE CONsTITUTION OF THE SENATE JuDIcARY COMM., THE VOTING
RIGHTs AcT., reprinted in S. REP. No. 97-417, supra note 21, at 107. The Honorable Orrin




committee expressly embraced the Bolden [I] view that a success-
ful vote dilution claim required a showing of racial intent.
Moreover, the Subcommittee in its lengthy report, raised the spec-
ter of hundreds of suits against at-large systems and other electo-
ral practices across the country if the House language were
adopted. Discounting the proviso that the mere absence of propor-
tional representation would be insufficient to sustain a dilution
claim, the Subcommittee contended:
[I]t appears that any political subdivision which has a significant
racial or language minority population and which has not achieved
proportional representation by race or language group would be in
jeopardy of a section 2 violation under the proposed results test. If
any one or more of a number of additional "objective factors of dis-
crimination" were present, a violation is likely and court-ordered re-
structuring of the electoral system almost certain to follow.148
The Subcommittee went on to delineate the potential objective
factors referred to in the preceding passage.
A partial list of these "objective factors," gleaned from various
sources, includes (1) some history of discrimination; (2) at-large vot-
ing systems or multi-member districts; (3) some history of "dual"
school systems; (4) cancellation of registration for failure to vote; (5)
residency requirements for voters; (6) special requirements for inde-
pendent or third-party candidates; (7) off-year elections; (8) sub-
stantial candidate cost requirements; (9) staggered terms of office;
(10) high economic costs associated with registration; (11) disparity
in voter registration by race; (12) history of lack of proportional rep-
resentation; (13) disparity in literacy rates by race; (14) evidence of
racial bloc voting; (15) history of English-only ballots; (16) history of
poll taxes; (17) disparity in distribution of services by race; (18)
numbered electoral posts; (19) prohibitions on single-shot voting;
and (20) majority vote requirements.149
Notwithstanding the Subcommittee's acerbic rejection of the
House revision of section 2, a majority of the parent Judiciary
Committee plainly supported the House language. In a well-publi-
cized compromise, however, the full committee adopted a modifica-
tion of the House version that was designed ostensibly to clarify
the House language and ground section 2 on the Supreme Court's
148. S. REP. No. 97-417, supra note 21, at 151-52 (footnotes omitted).
149. Id. at 143-44 (footnotes omitted).
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holding in White v. Regester.150 The Committee's draft of section 2
won the approval of the full Senate when it passed the Voting
Rights Act extension on June 18, 1982. Five days later, the House
accepted the Senate's language for section 2; and thus the Senate
Judiciary Committee's recasting of section 2 became law. Section 2
now reads:
Section 2. (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any
State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial
or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guaran-
tees set forth in section 4(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b).
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the total-
ity of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading
to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens pro-
tected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to
which members of a protected class have been elected to office in
the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be
considered: Provided, that nothing in this section establishes a right
to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to
their proportion in the population.151
As noted above, the Senate Judiciary Committee asserted that
its revision of section 2 was consistent with White, which, in the
Committee's view, required no proof of racial motivation in a suc-
cessful dilution claim. The Committee report contended that the
new language of section 2 was designed to guarantee that minority
voters have an equal opportunity to participate in the same politi-
cal process that other citizens enjoy. 52 Proof of a violation of sec-
tion 2 might include " a variety" of the following factors, according
to the Committee report:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or
political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the
minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the
150. Id. at 27-28.
151. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(a)-(b), 96 Stat. 131,
134.




2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or politi-
cal subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used
unusually large election districts, or other voting practices or proce-
dures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against
the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of
the minority group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state
or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such ar-
eas as education, employment and health;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or
subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been
elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as
part of plaintiffs' evidence to establish a violation are:
whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of
elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the
minority group;
whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's
use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice or procedure is tenuous. 153
The Committee report observed "that there is no requirement that
any particular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of
them point one way or another.""" While the report indicated that
the Judiciary Committee intended to ease the burden of proof fac-
ing minority plaintiffs in dilution cases, it took issue with the Sub-
committee's general and specific predictions regarding the outcome
of dilution actions. The report concluded that the revised section 2
would not lead to the "wholesale invalidation of electoral
structures. '" 155
It is important to recognize that in rewriting section 2 both the
Senate and House Judiciary Committees invoked the enforcement
power of Congress under the fourteenth amendment, as well as the
fifteenth amendment."56 Tying the revised language of section 2 to
the fourteenth amendment presumably eliminates any doubt re-
153. Id. at 28-29 (footnotes omitted).
154. Id. at 29.
155. Id. at 31-35.
156. S. REP. No. 97-417, supra note 21, at 40; H.R. RFP. No. 97-227, supra note 21, at 31.
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garding the application of section 2 to vote dilution controversies:
recall that the plurality in Bolden [I] had asserted that the
fifteenth amendment did not reach questions of vote dilution (as
opposed to denial or abridgment of the individual right to vote)
and that section 2 merely restated the fifteenth amendment. 157
Moreover, the grounding of section 2 in the fourteenth amendment
makes clear the power of the United States Attorney General to
initiate or intervene in litigation involving vote dilution claims,
since section 12 of the Voting Rights Act empowers the Attorney
General to undertake legal actions to enforce section 2. Prior to the
enactment of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, the au-
thority of the Attorney General to bring such actions had been a
matter of some dispute.15
157. Bolden [I1, 446 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1980).
158. In United States v. Uvalde Indep. School Dist., 625 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1002 (1981), the court held that the Attorney General could challenge the
at-large election of a school board in Uvalde, Texas. The court noted that Congress had
invoked its fourteenth amendment enforcement powers in bringing language minority
groups under the coverage of the Voting Rights Act in 1975 and in particular to section 2.
625 F.2d 547. Thus, section 2, as amended in 1975, clearly encompassed actions against at-
large systems in the view of the Fifth Circuit. Id. Since the court saw a clear link between
section 2 and the fourteenth amendment, there was no need to resolve the question of
whether the fifteenth amendment provided an independent basis for challenging at-large
elctions. However, two of the three judges believed that the fifteenth amendment did estab-
lish such a basis. Id. at 552. Contra id. at 556 (Hill, J., specially concurring). The defendant
school board appealed, but the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 451 U.S. 1002. Dissenting,
Justice Rehnquist asserted that the Attorney General could not bring a dilution action, in
part because "Congress based the addition to § 2 on its power to enforce the guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment in order to ensure the constitutionality of the change, not to
allow language minorities to challenge at-large voting districts on grounds of vote dilution."
Id. at 1005 (Rhenquist, J., dissenting). See also House Hearings, supra note 21, at 2034-35
(statement of David F. Walbert); S. REP. No. 97-417, supra note 21, at 17-19; Note, The
Voting Rights Act and Local At-Large Elections, 67 VA. L. REv. 1011 (1981).
Aside from Uvalde, a number of other cases have addressed the question of whether a
dilution claim could be predicated on the fifteenth amendment. An affirmative answer is
provided by Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201, 206 n.5 (8th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 51
U.S.L.W. 3252 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1982); Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1372 (5th Cir. 1981),
afl'd sub nom. Rogers v. Lodge, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 3572 (1982). Contra McMillan v.
Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1243 n.9, appeal dismissed under Rule 53, sub nom. City
of Pensacola v. Jenkins, 453 U.S. 946, vacated, 688 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Kirk-
sey v. City of Jackson, 506 F. Supp. 491, 504-06 (S.D. Miss.),. af'd, 663 F.2d 659, 664-65 (5th
Cir. 1981).
In Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3276 n.6 (1982), the Supreme Court "express[ed] no
view on the application of the Fifteenth Amendment" to the vote dilution claim against an
at-large system presented in that case.
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D. Rogers v. Lodge"'
The alteration of section 2 already has exerted some influence on
the Supreme Court's perception of the status of at-large elections.
On July 1, 1982, in a six-to-three decision the Supreme Court af-
firmed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that
Burke County, Georgia's at-large system for electing its five-mem-
ber Board of Commissioners violated the fourteenth amend-
ment. 160 Oral arguments for this Supreme Court case had occurred
while hearings on the Voting Rights Act were underway in the
Senate. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist in dissent, ar-
gued that the holding with respect to Burke County could not "be
reconciled persuasively" with the Court's decision in Bolden [I].6'
Justice Stevens, also dissenting, referred somewhat obliquely to
the impact that congressional debate over section 2 may have had
on the Court.
Nor, in my opinion, could there be any doubt about the constitu-
tionality of an amendment to the Voting Rights Act that would re-
quire Burke County and other covered jurisdictions to abandon spe-
cific kinds of at-large voting schemes that perpetuate the effects of
past discrimination. "As against the reserved powers of the States,
Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitu-
tional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting." . . . It might
indeed be wise policy to accelerate the transition of minority groups
to a position of political power commensurate with their voting
strength by amending the Act to prohibit the use of multi-member
districts in all covered jurisdictions. 16 2
The six-person majority in Lodge included Chief Justice Burger,
a convert from the Bolden [I] plurality, Justice Blackmun, who
had concurred in the result in Bolden [I], and Justice O'Connor,
who had replaced Justice Stewart, the author of the plurality opin-
ion in Bolden [I]. The other three justices in the Lodge majority
were Brennan, Marshall, and White, who wrote the Court's opin-
ion; all three had dissented in Bolden [I].
The facts in Lodge did not present sharply discernible differ-
ences from those in Bolden [I]. Blacks constituted about 54 per-
cent of the 19,349 people in Burke County in 1980 and about 38
159. Rogers v. Lodge, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 3282 (Powell, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 3283 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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percent of the county's registered voters in 1978. The at-large elec-
toral plan for the Burke County Board of Commissioners dated
back to 1911; the plan imposed a majority vote requirement on
both the primary and general elections and required candidates to
run for a specific seat on the Board. In the seven decades of the
plan's operation, no black had ever been elected to the Board."6 3
As in Bolden [I], the district court in Lodge1 64 had relied pri-
marily on the Zimmer e5 factors in analyzing the evidence before it,
although the district court in Lodge was able also to draw upon the
Fifth Circuit's holdings in Nevett IF"ss and Kirksey v. Board of
Supervisors.167 The district court, thus, found that blacks were de-
nied equal access to the political process by such factors as "the
virtual 'lilly-white' Democratic Executive Committee.. .. [and the
exclusion of blacks from] the normal course of personal contact
politics in Burke County."16 Evidence of unresponsiveness encom-
passed the failure of Burke County commissioners to appoint
blacks to boards or committees in other than token numbers and
the discriminatory delivery of public services, illustrated by the
district court's discussion of road paving.
(1) The Mamie Jo Rhodes Subdivision, inhabited by Blacks, is un-
paved. It is directly across from a subdivision inhabited by Whites.
The latter has paved roads. (2) Millers Pond Road is paved up to
the pond, used by Whites; but from that point the road is unpaved,
although that portion is inhabited by Blacks. (3) Paving on Hatchett
Road ends at the residence of a White; yet Blacks live on the re-
mainder of the unpaved road. (4) The streets of Alexander are
paved in the section of town inhabited by Whites; but the roads in
the black section are not paved. And (5) county road 284 is paved to
the point where the last white lives, but beyond, where the road is
inhabited by Blacks, the road is unpaved. It is of interest to note
that the road to the dog trial field is paved even though trials are
held but once a year. By contrast, there is still an unpaved road to a
school. Although the last unpaved road to a white school was paved
163. Id. at 3274.
164. Lodge v. Buxton, No. 176-55 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 26, 1978), aff'd, 639 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir.
1981), aff'd sub nom. Rogers v. Lodge, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982). The district
court's order, findings of facts, and conclusions of law are set out in Appellants' Brief
(Statement as to Jurisdiction) at 61a, Rogers v. Lodge, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982).
Subsequent citations to the district court's holding refer to this source.
165. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1981).
166. Nevett II, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978).
167. 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977). See infra note 236.
168. Lodge v. Buxton, No. 176-55, supra note 164, at 88a.
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in 1930, it seems as if the road to Palmer Elementary School, for-
merly an all-black school, and still predominately black, remains
unpaved.169
The district court found the lingering effects of past discrimina-
tion in the depressed voter participation of blacks, the continuing
pattern of racial bloc voting, and the depressed socioeconomic sta-
tus of blacks. While these findings tend to fit the Zimmer frame-
work, the district court, relying on Kirksey1 0 gave great weight to
the economic and educational disparities between blacks and
whites in Burke County.
It is clear that Blacks in Burke County have a depressed socio-
economic status, due in part to past discrimination. The fact that a
substantial majority of Blacks have incomes of three-fourths, or less
than, a poverty level income is an important factor with respect to
access both to the machinery of the political processes, and to the
social avenues of political access, each of which is most important in
this tightly-knit, rural county.171
Regarding the enhancing factors of Zimmer, the district court
cited the majority vote and place requirements. Furthermore, it
noted that the lack of a ward residency requirement and the very
large size of the county (832 square miles, or close to two-thirds
the area of Rhode Island) made "it more difficult for Blacks to get
to polling places or to campaign for office. '17 2
Writing for the Supreme Court's majority in Lodge, Justice
White deferred to the district court's findings of fact and held that
on the basis of such a finding the district court had properly in-
ferred that Burke County's at-large system was being maintained
for a discriminatory purpose. 1' Indeed, Justice White indicated
that the inference of intent was itself a factual finding that the
Court -ought not to disturb unless such findings were clearly erro-
neous. 17 4 Remarkably, despite the caustic language used by the
Bolden [I] plurality to describe the Zimmer criteria, Justice White
agreed with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, that the district
169. Id. at 79a-88a.
170. Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 139.
171. Lodge v. Buxton, No. 176-55, supra note 164, at 95a.
172. Id. at 91a.
173. Rogers v. Lodge, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3278 (1982).
174. Id.
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court's application of the Zimmer standards to the facts of Lodge
had been proper and had given due regard to the question of
intent.175
The grounds on which Lodge might be distinguished from
Bolden [I] are not altogether clear, as the dissenting opinion of
Justice Powell noted.17 6 Justice White, in fact, makes little, if any,
effort to distinguish the two cases. However, Lodge might be dis-
tinguished from Bolden [I] in at least five substantive ways: (1)
blacks constituted a majority of the population in Burke County
(versus one-third of the population in Mobile); (2) the geographic
size of Burke County might be regarded as an impediment to par-
ticipation not present in Mobile; (3) the record of discrimination in
Lodge (such as the remains of the "Nigger-hooks" at the court-
house) 17 7 might be more compelling than the facts in Mobile; (4)
socio-economic disparities between blacks and whites might be
more severe in Burke County than in Mobile; and (5) the Burke
County Board might not engage in the joint exercise of executive
and legislative authority to the extent that the Mobile city com-
mission does.
Taken either individually or collectively, these distinctions seem
of little import. Indeed, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that
in Lodge the Supreme Court overruled Bolden [I] sub silentio. In
his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens reiterated and elaborated
upon themes that he had advanced in Bolden [I.178 His argument,
stripped to its essentials, is this: both Bolden [I] and Lodge indi-
cate that certain electoral practices, otherwise constitutional, can
be rendered unconstitutional by the "subjective motivations" of
the officials who adopt or who refuse to modify such procedures.17 9
If every racial and political minority were to be accorded protec-
tion against the practices complained of in Lodge, the Court would
be "entering a vast wonderland of judicial review of political activ-
ity,"180 since the Court could determine the validity of a given elec-
toral practice only by examining the context in which it was em-
ployed.181 The Court can avoid this wonderland, according to
175. Id.
176. Id. at 3282 (Powell, J., dissenting).
177. Lodge v. Buxton, No. 176-55, supra note 164, at 77a.
178. Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. at 3282-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 3286.




Justice Stevens, only by limiting the scope of constitutional protec-
tion against dilution to racial minorities. This path he rejects, for
"[a] constitutional standard that gave special protection to politi-
cal groups identified by racial characteristics would be inconsistent
with the basic tenet of the Equal Protection Clause." '182
A better solution, in Justice Stevens' view, would be to identify
"specific features" of local governmental structure "that raise con-
stitutional concerns and decide whether, singly or in combination,
they are valid. '18 3 The Court has followed this approach with re-
gard to such issues as burdens imposed on independent candidates
and "requiring political candidates to pay filing fees." 84 Once a
practice, however, is determined to be unconstitutional, "the objec-
tive circumstances that led to [that] declaration. . . would invali-
date a similar law wherever it might be found."'"5 Justice Stevens
cites the poll tax as an example, noting that Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections held that "'a State violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause ...whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or
payment of any fee an electoral standard.' "'186 He goes on to assert
that Lodge need not address the issue of at-large elections.
For it is apparent that elimination of the majority run-off require-
ment and the numbered posts would enable a well-organized minor-
ity to elect one or two candidates to the county board. That conse-
quence could be achieved without replacing the at-large system
itself with five single-member districts. In other words, minority ac-
cess to the political process could be effected by invalidating specific
rules that impede that access and without changing the basic struc-
ture of the local government unit.187
182. Id. at 3293.
183. Id. at 3285.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 3286.
186. Id. at 3285 n.9 (quoting Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666
(1966)).
187. 102 S. Ct. at 3288 n.22 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Powell's dissenting opinion
appears to stake a middle ground between Justice Stevens' position and the majority's inter-
pretation. Justice Powell suggests that the intent standard of Bolden [I] be retained, but
that the presence of "objective factors," as noted by Justice Stevens, be used as indicia of
intent. Id. at 3282 (Powell, J., dissenting). Apparently this means that the enhancing factors
of Zimmer-such as the use of a place rule or a majority vote requirement-would provide
the key to the determination of invidious purpose.
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IV. VOTE DILUTION: THE SEARCH FOR MANAGEABLE STANDARDS
A. Results versus Intent: A Brief Review of Cases
Justice Stevens' concern with the failure of the Supreme Court's
majority in Lodge to set out manageable standards for assessing
dilution, as noted, derives from his view that neither the results-
oriented approach of Zimmer nor the intent-focused analysis of
Bolden [I] offers much guidance to courts trying dilution cases.
From this perspective, the highly publicized 1982 Senate debate
over whether section 2 of the Voting Rights Act should embrace an
intent test or a results test failed to come to grips with the evident
deficiencies of both tests. Indeed, a selective examination of cases
decided according to the Zimmer criteria and to the intent test of
Bolden [I] reveals a remarkable degree of inconsistency among
judges in the application of law and evidentiary standards.
Cases involving the application of the Zimmer criteria to the as-
sessment of at-large systems reveal two major weaknesses in the
results'oriented approach. The first problem relates to the subjec-
tivity of each of the factors, taken alone, under a Zimmer or other
results-type analysis. Responsiveness, for instance, has proved to
be a particularly elusive concept. Consider, for example, Kirksey v.
City of Jackson188-an unsuccessful challenge to at-large elections
for a three-member city commission to which blacks, who com-
prised two-fifths of the city's population, had never been elected.
In this case, the district court considered in detail an extensive ar-
ray of policies, including appointments and employment in city
government, planning, zoning, street resurfacing and lighting, fire
protection, and parks. The court, while recognizing extensive dis-
crimination in city policies through the late 1960's and early
1970's, emphasized a growing responsiveness by the city to minor-
ity needs. For example, the judge observed:
Although the defendants concede that the percentage of black em-
ployees does not equate [sic] the percentage of black population...
and do not deny that the above three employment discrimination
suits have "produced results,". . . they nevertheless point out that
the city did voluntarily enter into consent decrees in each of the
above three cases and that these consent decrees have produced a
dramatically favorable hiring increase of blacks. 8 '
188. 461 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D. Miss. 1978), vacated and remanded, 625 F.2d 21 (5th Cir.
1980). See infra note 208.
189. 461 F. S~pp. at 1295.
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This interpretation of responsiveness contrasts sharply with that
of the district court in Hendrix v. McKinney,19 ° which found dilu-
tion in the at-large election of commissioners in Montgomery
County, Alabama.
While the percentage of blacks employed has increased, they remain
assigned for the most part to low paying and unskilled positions.
Defendants contend that, despite this slow progress, the Commis-
sion is in compliance with the court order. Compliance, however,
does not necessarily prove responsiveness. The fact that the Com-
mission continues to operate under court order proves the
contrary.19 1
The ambiguity of the responsiveness criterion was criticized by
the plurality in Bolden [I] and led the Senate Judiciary Committee
to place responsiveness far down the list of factors relevant to the
adjudication of at-large systems under section 2. In fact, the Com-
mittee rejected the view of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Lodge v. Buxton that a showing of nonresponsiveness was an es-
sential element in a successful dilution suit.
192
The subjectivity of the responsiveness factor is a weakness
shared by nearly all of the evidentiary criteria considered under
Zimmer and under the Senate Judiciary Committee's revised list.
The reason for this pervasive subjectivity is not that responsive-
ness or political access or lingering effects of past discrimination
cannot be demonstrated by reference to objective circumstances or
facts. On the contrary, nonresponsiveness, however vague in the-
ory, can be readily reduced to evidentiary requirements of employ-
ment data, road paving practices, and the record of civil rights liti-
gation against the jurisdiction in question. Denial of political
access can be reduced to quantifiable data on the number of mi-
nority candidates elected, differential levels of black and white
voter registration, and various measures of racially-polarized bloc
voting. However, these numbers or facts do not speak for them-
selves, for both the results test of Zimmer and the somewhat dif-
ferent version of the results test in section 2 confer upon district
court judges immense discretion in evaluating the legality of at-
190. 460 F. Supp. 626 (M.D. Ala. 1978).
191. Id. at 632.
192. Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1981). See S. REP. No. 97-417, supra note
21.
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large systems. 193
Indeed, the second and more important problem with a results-
oriented analysis is that no particular set of data, facts, or circum-
stances make out a showing of dilution under an at-large system,
since a judge is to base his or her decision on the "aggregate of
factors" or "totality of circumstances." The flexibility of the "to-
tality of circumstances" doctrine can be illustrated by brief refer-
ence to three cases.
In 1977, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district
court holding of unconstitutional dilution in the maintenance of
at-large elections for city council in Dallas, Texas. In Lipscomb v.
Wise, 94 the court found city policies responsive to blacks and His-
panics who comprised 25 percent and 8 to 10 percent, respectively,
of the city's population. The at-large plan dated to 1907 and so
was not rooted in tenuous state policy. The facts, however, satis-
fied the criteria of denial of access and lingering effects of past
discrimination.19
In Zimmer, the facts did not show unequivocally that the chal-
lenged at-large system diluted black electoral strength. 96 Elections
for three of the nine school board seats in 1972, for example, pro-
duced two black winners. However, the majority opinion in the
case did not believe such evidence foreclosed the possibility of
dilution.
Such success might, on occasion, be attributable to the work of poli-
ticians who, apprehending that the support of a black candidate
would be politically expedient, campaign to insure his election. Or
such success might be attributable to political support motivated by
different considerations-namely that election of a black candidate
193. The extent of racially polarized bloc voting, for example, can be demonstrated by a
variety of statistical measures. House Hearings, supra note 21, at 541-43 (statement of
Frank L. Parker). But various courts disagree about how sharply voting patterns of white
and black neighborhoods must diverge before bloc voting becomes probative evidence of
dilution. See, e.g., Washington v. Finley, 664 F.2d 913, 918 (4th Cir. 1981); McMillan v.
Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1241-42 n.6 (1981), appeal dismissed under Rule 53, sub
nom. City of Pensacola v. Jenkins, 453 U.S. 946, vacated, 688 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1981); City
of Port Arthur v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 987, 1007 n.136 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd, 51
U.S.L.W. 4033 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1982); Mosely v. Sadler, 469 F. Supp. 563, 568 (E.D. Tex.
1979).
194. 551 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1977).
195. Only two blacks had been elected since 1907; voting was racially polarized; and a
slating group controlled electoral success. Id.
196. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1981).
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would thwart successful challenges to electoral schemes on dilution
grounds. 197
The court's observation underscores the looseness of the "aggre-
gate of factors" concept, a fact which becomes more apparent in
unsuccessful dilution challenges. In Blacks United for Lasting
Leadership, Inc. v. City of Shreveport,198 decided by the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals on the same day as Nevett II,19 the court
reversed a district court's holding that at-large election of a five-
member commission resulted in unconstitutional dilution of the
black vote. In a city in which blacks comprised about one-third of
a population of 182,000, no black had been elected to the governing
commission. The appellate court noted, however, that white candi-
dates sought the support of black voters. The underrepresentation
of blacks in city employment and the evidence of discrimination
against black neighborhoods in street maintenance were offset by a
new responsiveness by city officials to minority needs. The panel
noted the failure of the district court to show how past discrimina-
tion limited present participation by blacks. The court remanded
the case for further findings of fact, although a dissent argued that
the necessary proof for dilution had been established. 00
While these examples suggest that a results-oriented analysis
leaves too much discretion in the hands of district and appellate
court judges, it is plain that the intent standard set out by the
Supreme Court in Bolden [I] is an even more amorphous guide to
adjudication of at-large systems than the effects approach of Zim-
mer or White. A major shortcoming in a dilution analysis that re-
lies heavily if not exclusively on the demonstrable motivation un-
derlying the choice or maintenance of a particular electoral system
is that the legality of a given at-large system is made to depend
upon the politics of its adoption and not on its objective impact.
197. Id. at 1307.
198. 571 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1978).
199. Nevett II, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978).
200. 571 F.2d at 255-57 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). It should be noted that on May 17,
1978,-less than two weeks after the circuit court's ruling-Shreveport voters approved by a
two-to-one margin a referendum that established a mayor-council form of government with
a seven member council to be elected from single-member districts. Correspondence from
Dianne Lee, Deputy Clerk, City of Shreveport (June 5, 1981). The switch from at-large to
ward elections was a condition of the Justice Department's withdrawal of a 1976 objection
(under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act) to annexations having a dilutive effect on black
voting strength. See Cotrell & Stevens, The 1975 Voting Rights Act, Annexation Policy and
Growth in the Sunbelt, 3 URB. L. REV. 1, 25 (1979).
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Thus, an at-large system instituted after the court-ordered elimi-
nation of the white primary-as in the Albany, Georgia, case noted
earlier-may be more vulnerable to legal challenge than a second
system adopted under race-neutral circumstances. This would hold
true even though the nature of race-neutral circumstances might
have been total disenfranchisement of blacks and even though the
second jurisdiction might permit less present electoral opportunity
for blacks than the first system.
In McMillan v. Escambia County201 a Fifth Circuit panel ruled
in 1981 that the at-large election of the county school board had
been adopted in 1947 with impermissible racial motive in response
to the elimination of the white primary in 1945.202 The panel also
invalidated at-large elections for city council in Pensacola, largely
on the basis of evidence that a change from a mixed ward/ at-large
system to at-large elections was motivated by a desire to curb
growing black electoral strength in one of the wards. Adoption of
an at-large scheme for the county commission in 1901, however,
survived court scrutiny; and the panel upheld the present electoral
format for the commission. This somewhat anomalous result was
reached even though many of the objective circumstances relating
to elections to the school board, county commission, and city coun-
cil were similar, if not identical. Blacks constituted one-fifth of the
county population, yet no black had been elected to the five-mem-
ber commission or seven-member school board. A party primary
with a majority vote requirement applied to both the five-member
commission and the seven-member school board, while residency
requirements affected all five commission seats and five of the
seven board seats. The black proportion of the city's population
amounted to one-third. Candidates for the ten-member council ran
for specific posts based on residency in one of the city's five wards,
and general elections carried a majority vote requirement. Follow-
ing appointment to city council, two blacks subsequently won elec-
tions to retain their seats.2 03 Racial bloc voting apparently charac-
terized races for the city council, the school board, and the county
commission. While the facts relating to these cases admit to more
complexity than this brief analysis would suggest, they do illus-
201. 638 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed under Rule 53, sub nom. City of Pensa-
cola v. Jenkins, 453 U.S. 946 (1981), vacated, 688 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1982).
202. 638 F.2d at 1245-47.
203. 638 F.2d 1239.
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trate the mischief bred by the intent standard. 4
The opinions of the district court in the second round of litiga-
tion against the city commission in Mobile and the school board in
Mobile County further illustrate the problems associated with the
search for intent in vote dilution cases. In each case, the retrial
focused on the question of whether the at-large system in question
had been created with official intent to discriminate against black
voters. What made these proceedings so remarkable is that the
search for invidious motivation spanned virtually the entire history
of Alabama as a state because the use of at-large elections of the
school boards dated back to an 1826 state statute, and the first
adoption of at-large elections for the city occurred with initial in-
corporation under Alabama law in 1819.20
In the city's case,206 however, the record showed that from 1828
until 1868 the city utilized ward elections or a combination of ward
and at-large elections for the city council, which was bicameral for
much of this period. The district court's salient findings regarding
discriminatory intent in the city's case are set out in the following
passage.
[T]he court finds first that the 1870 Act was implemented at the
local level, and its ambiguities resolved, with the design to eliminate
black influence on municipal elections. During the period 1874 to
1907, white supremacist Democrats controlled legislative and munic-
ipal positions. All Mobile elections were conducted at-large, though
the Democrats selected their candidates by ward with only whites
voting. The at-large elections were utilized to negate black influence.
The 1901 Alabama Constitution had as a principal purpose the dis-
franchisement of blacks, the natural and intended consequence of
which was to preclude black office holding. That purpose was in gen-
eral successful, so that most black voting had been eliminated by
1907. The 1908 ward elections in Mobile, however, demonstrated
that the remaining black voters had some influence in black
wards.207
The court went on to describe the 1911 statute setting up Mobile's
204. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, the Fifth Circuit
vacated its holding in the Escambia County Commission case. McMillan v. Escambia
County, 688 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1982). For further discussion of this case, see infra note 230.
205. Brown v. Board of School Comm'rs, 542 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
206. Bolden [II, 542 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
207. Id. at 1064.
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present at-large commission. "[A]lthough the desire to place the
business and professional classes in control of Mobile's government
and to exclude the lower classes from participation was an impor-
tant factor in adopting the commission government in 1911-at-
large elections-invidious racial reasons played a substantial and
significant part.
20
In the school board's case, the district court followed a similar
line of analysis, finding invidious intent in the state legislature's
repeal in 1876 of a provision guaranteeing some minority (that is,
black and/or Republican) representation on the at-large board.20 9
The court also found impermissible intent in the efforts of the
school board to maintain the at-large system, particularly in a se-
ries of actions undertaken by the school board to thwart the in-
stant litigation.210
208. Id. at 1075. Compare Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 506 F. Supp. 491 (S.D. Miss. 1981),
where Judge Walter L. Nixon ruled on remand that plaintiffs had failed to show that Jack-
son's commission plan had been created or maintained with racially discriminatory intent.
In a 1978 decision in the same litigation, Judge Nixon had held for the defendant city, but
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1980 vacated that decision in light of the Supreme
Court's Bolden [I] ruling. Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 461 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D. Miss. 1978).
See supra text accompanying note 188. In the 1981 opinion, which followed a supplemental
trial, Judge Nixon found that neither the 1912 referendum establishing Jackson's commis-
sion plan nor a 1977 referendum in which voters rejected a proposed change to a mayor-
council plan with nine single-member districts evidenced unconstitutionally discriminatory
purpose. However, Judge Nixon also held that the motivation of individual voters partici-
pating in a referendum "is not a proper inquiry." 506 F. Supp. at 500. The court also as-
serted that regardless of whether racially discriminatory motivation had played a role in the
1912 and 1972 referenda, the outcome in each instance would have been the same, because
of the predominant influence of non-racial factors. Id. at 517-18. The Fifth Circuit affirmed,
663 F.2d 659 (1981), and denied a rehearing, 669 F.2d 316 (1982). See also House Hearings,
supra note 21, at 515 (statement of Frank L. Parker).
209. Brown v. Board of School Comm'rs, 542 F. Supp. 1078, 1090 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
210. Id. at 1096-99. In 1975, after the dilution suit had been filed, the school board agreed
to support state legislation establishing a ward electoral scheme for the board, provided that
certain minor changes in the proposed legislation were made. After the Alabama legislature
enacted the legislation, the board moved to have the suit against it dismissed. When the
federal district court dismissed the suit, the board proceeded to challenge the validity of the
statute in state court, alleging that the law violated the Alabama Constitution. The state
court found the law unconstitutional on the basis of the language that the board itself had
recommended be added to the bill in the legislature. The invalidation of the ward plan
reactivated the dilution suit. The board then proposed a new single-member district plan to
be introduced at the 1976 legislative session and unsuccessfully urged the district court to
postpone the suit until the bill was introduced. However, in testimony at the dilution trial,
the board's counsel expressed his certainty that the new bill itself would be unconstitu-
tional. This sequence of events led Judge Pittman to find that the board had entered into
the litigation with "unclean hands." Id. at 1096-97. The record of the board's action was
cited in Judge Pittman's original opinion in the school board proceedings as evidence of
improper motive. Brown v. Moore, 428 F. Supp. 1123, 1133-34 (S.D. Ala. 1976). After that
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Whether the roots of present-day discrimination can be traced to
the reconstruction of events one hundred years past is perhaps an
important question for historians. It is less clear whether the cause
of justice is well served by this kind of tortuous quest for elusive
evidence of intent.
B. The Search for Judicially Manageable Standards of Dilution
Efforts of the courts, and more recently of Congress, to address
the constitutional or statutory validity of at-large elections,
whether couched in terms of intent or results, in actuality have
sought to answer separate, but interrelated questions. First, what
forms of vote dilution does the Constitution or the Voting Rights
Act prohibit? Second, can the courts or Congress develop manage-
able standards for the adjudication of dilution claims? Manageable
standards here refer to guidelines that sufficiently direct the dis-
cretion of district court judges who try dilution claims and that
impose practical limitations on the number of dilution suits that
come before the courts. Third, can the courts provide effective
remedies for those cases in which illegal dilution is uncovered?
Since it is a settled principle of law that a particular group is not
entitled to representation on a legislative body in proportion to its
percentage of the population,21' the first question calls for a defini-
tion of the precise circumstances under which the absence of pro-
portional representation amounts to illegal dilution. The question
also requires some attention to the issue of whether protection
against dilution is limited to racial or language minorities that his-
torically have been victimized by discriminatory treatment under
the law or whether the protection extends to any political group
whose voting strength is undermined by such devices as at-large
elections.
How illegal dilution is defined, of course, affects, and is affected
by, concern with the need to establish manageable standards to
first opinion, Judge Pittman ordered the implementation of a single-member districting
plan to be phased in over several elections. The plan led to the election of two blacks in
1978 at the election of the first two ward seats. Before the black members took office, how-
ever, the current members of the school board modified the board's operating procedures in
order to reduce "the relative power of the new black members." 542 F. Supp. at 1097-99.
These actions, incidentally, were noted in the Brief of the Appellees, Bolden [I], 446 U.S. 55
(1978). See also supra note 90.
211. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, - U-.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3276 (1982); City of Mobile
v. Bolden [I], 446 U.S. 55, 75-76 (1978); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973);
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149-50 (1971).
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govern adjudication of dilution cases. The Supreme Court or Con-
gress may make it easy or difficult to prove dilution, but whatever
standards of proof the Court establishes, it does so with the aware-
ness that these criteria will guide the range of discretion judges in
lower courts will exercise and will influence the number of dilution
suits filed. Thus, the plurality opinion and Justice Stevens' concur-
ring opinion in the Supreme Court's Bolden [I] decision expressed
concern that the adoption of Justice Marshall's definition of un-
constitutional dilution would result in "endless litigation" and
plunge the courts into "a voracious political thicket." '212 In con-
trast, Justice White in his dissent in Bolden [I] contended that the
plurality's intent standard "leaves the courts below adrift on un-
charted seas.121 3
The issue of manageable standards carries over to the considera-
tion of what remedies courts might apply in order to eliminate un-
constitutional dilution in those cases in which it is determined to
exist. Judicial concern with the problem of developing effective
remedies is evidenced by Justice White's comments in Whitcomb:
[If] the problems of multi-member districts are unbearable or even
unconstitutional it is not at all clear that the remedy is a single-
member district system with its lines carefully drawn to ensure rep-
resentation to sizable racial, ethnic, economic, or religious groups
and with its own capacity for overrepresenting parties and interests
and even for permitting a minority of the voters to control the legis-
lature and government of a State.214
Dissenting in the Supreme Court's decision in Lodge, Justice Pow-
ell asserted that challenges to at-large elections involved the courts
in what "is inherently a political area, where the identification of a
seeming violation does not necessarily suggest an enforceable judi-
cial remedy-or at least none short of a system of quotas or group
representation." '215
The question of whether dilution can be remedied effectively,
like the problems of defining illegal dilution and of developing
manageable standards of adjudication, resists easy answers. With
212. The language regarding "endless litigation" which appeared in Whitcomb, 403 U.S.
at 157, is cited both by the plurality in Bolden [1], 446 U.S. at 80, and by Justice Stevens,
who also refers to "a voracious political thicket," id. at 93 (Stevens, J., concurring).
213. 446 U.S. at 103 (White, J., dissenting).
214. 403 U.S. at 160.
215. 102 S. Ct. at 3282 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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regard to the constitutionality of at-large elections, however, judi-
cial responses have tended to follow one of three paths:216 (1) non-
intervention, a view that would hold that vote dilution is an inher-
ently ambigious political question for which manageable judicial
standards cannot be developed and which courts ought to avoid;
(2) selective judicial intervention, an approach that would permit
courts to strike down an at-large election system where it could be
shown that it operated to "fence out" or exclude systematically a
racial or language minority from influence at the polls;21 7 and (3)
uniform judicial or legislative intervention, an approach under
which the courts or Congress would forbid on a national basis the
use of certain electoral devices such as numbered posts or a major-
ity vote requirement in conjunction with at-large elections or mul-
timember districts. 21s Each of these paths is discussed below.
That courts ought to stay out of the "political thicket" of contro-
versies centering on questions of vote dilution or debasement was
articulated forcefully by Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opin-
ion in Baker v. Carr219 and by Justice Harlan in a succession of
dissenting and concurring opinions in reapportionment cases be-
ginning with Baker.2 ° In Whitcomb, Justice Harlan cited the
216. Ward E. Elliott employs a similar classification in his analysis of the reapportion-
ment cases of the 1960's. W. ELLIOTT, THE RISE OF GUARDIAN DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME
COURT AND VOTING RIGHTS DIsPuTEs, 1845-1969, at 265-74 (1974).
217. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973).
218. It should be emphasized that the "uniform intervention" contemplated here is con-
cerned with the prohibition of one or more percentage-determining rules on a national basis.
One can imagine, of course, a very different and more radical brand of uniform intervention,
namely an outright prohibition against at-large elections. The view that the logic of Burns v.
Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), should lead
courts to impose a per se rule against at-large systems is developed in Berry & Dye, The
Discriminatory Effects of At-Large Elections, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 85 (1979). Leaving aside
the validity of this view as a matter of constitutional law, a ban on at-large elections would
constitute unwise policy. It would eliminate at-large systems in countless cities, counties,
towns, and school districts in which at-large elections do not operate in racially discrimina-
tory fashion; furthermore, it would nearly obliterate what remains of state and local discre-
tion in the realm of local electoral organization. One might add that a rationale that would
condemn at-large systems as a rule also would call into question those single-member electo-
ral systems in which the number of seats was too small to insure proportional representation
of minority interests. Finally, it should be noted that the 1982 revision of section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act was not intended to prohibit at-large electoral systems generally. See,
e.g., 128 CONG. REC. S6526 (daily ed. June 9, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Hatch); supra text
accompanying note 155.
219. 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter had earlier
used the term "political thicket" in his plurality opinion in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549, 556 (1946).
220. 369 U.S. at 330 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
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emergence of litigation challenging multimember districts which
are dilutive of minority voting rights as constituting evidence of
the judiciary's imprudence in entering the reapportionment
thicket.2 '
Justice Harlan's view that the courts had no proper role in vote
dilution disputes rested in part on his opinion that the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment did not reach such
questions, but also on his belief that the development of manage-
able standards of adjudication was virtually impossible.222 In vote
dilution cases after Whitcomb, various justices on the Court have
followed Justice Harlan's nonintervention approach, although they
have advanced a rationale different from Harlan's. In Wise v. Lips-
comb,223 the 1978 case involving the remedy in a successful dilution
suit against at-large elections for city council in Dallas, Texas, Jus-
tice Rehnquist asserted in a separate opinion, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justices Powell and Stewart:
While this Court has found that the use of multi-member districts
in a state legislative apportionment plan may be invalid if "used in-
vidiously to cancel out or minimize the voting strength of racial
groups," . . . we have never had occasion to consider whether an
analogue of this highly amorphous theory may be applied to munici-
pal governments.224
The same four justices who joined in the Wise opinion came to-
gether as the plurality in Bolden [I], where they repeated their
doubt about the equivalence of multimember districts and at-large
elections.
We may assume, for present purposes, that an at-large election of
city officials with all the legislative, executive and administrative
power of the municipal government is constitutionally indistinguish-
able from the election of a few members of a state legislative body in
multimember districts-although this may be a rash assumption.225
The Bolden [I] plurality went on, of course, to develop a strin-
152 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 589 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
221. 403 U.S. at 170.
222. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 589 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
223. 437 U.S. 535 (1977).
224. Id. at 550 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
225. Bolden [1], 446 U.S. 55, 70 (1980).
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gent intent test that received renewed support from Justice Powell,
joined by Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion in Lodge.226
For Justices Powell and Rehnquist, the rigorous intent standard
set out both by the Bolden [I] plurality and by Justice Powell's
own dissenting opinion in Lodge amounted to nothing more than
an effort to extricate the courts from vote dilution challenges to at-
large elections-an approach signaled by Justice Rehnquist's opin-
ion in Wise.227 Indeed, Justice Powell's contention in Lodge that
attacks on at-large systems may not admit to acceptable remedies
is wholly consistent with the logic of nonintervention previously
articulated by Justice Harlan.
The strategy of nonintervention through the intent test of
Bolden [I] simply resolved the problems of developing judicially
manageable standards for assessing dilution and of protecting the
courts against an onslaught of suits against hundreds of local at-
large systems by making it highly unlikely that such suits could
succeed. The Supreme Court's decision in Lodge and congressional
revision of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, however, represent a
clear repudiation of the intent test insofar as the test was per-
ceived to support nonintervention. The reason for repudiation, of
course, is that a majority of justices and a majority of Congress
perceive that at-large elections under certain circumstances oper-
ate in plainly discriminatory fashion. Indeed, Justice Stevens, even
as he dissented in Lodge, lamented the abominable legacy of racial
discrimination in Burke County, Georgia.228
Under the approach referred to herein as selective intervention,
courts would develop and apply a test of unconstitutional dilution
or statutorily illegal dilution according to section 2 that would pro-
hibit at-large elections under those limited circumstances in which
at-large elections work an invidious and unconstitutional impedi-
ment to full electoral participation by racial and language minority
voters. Simultaneously, this approach would avoid (a) proscribing
at-large elections generally or (b) implying that non-racial or non-
language minority groups are entitled to similar constitutional
protection.
The principal judicial advocate of selective intervention on the
Supreme Court has been Justice White, who wrote the Court's
226. Rogers v. Lodge, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3281 (1982).
227. Wise, 437 U.S. 535. See supra text accompanying note 225.
228. 102 S. Ct. at 3283 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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opinions in Whitcomb, White, and Lodge and dissented in Bolden
[I]. Taken together these opinions indicate an attempt to avoid ex-
cessive entanglement of the judiciary in disputes arising from the
various claims of racial and political groups to a certain level of
representation and, at the same time, to strike down electoral
mechanisms that foreclose effective minority participation in the
political process.
If the virtue of selective intervention is that it can reach and
eliminate patently discriminatory systems such as the at-large
scheme in Burke County, the inherent weakness of this approach is
that clear distinctions among various cases are not easily or con-
vincingly drawn. While Justice White could distinguish between
the circumstances in Whitcomb and White (seeing no discrimina-
tion in the first case and invidious dilution in the second), Justices
Marshall and Brennan, two other selective interventionists, could
not make such a distinction.229
Thus, the principal shortcoming in the approach of selective in-
tervention is the inability of either the courts or Congress to set
out a test of dilution that will yield predictable results in similar
cases. Whether expressed as the White standards, the Zimmer cri-
teria, the Nevett II guidelines, or the section 2 criteria, various
tests of dilution have suffered from inherent ambiguity, leaving
their interpretation and application to the whim of district court
judges. The intent test of Bolden [I]-to the extent that it was
intended to guide rather than foreclose dilution suits-is, as well,
an amorphous standard. The imprecision of the tests under the ap-
proach of selective intervention creates a natural pressure among
litigants and judges to resolve the uncertainty of the standards.
This resolution may lead, in the manner of Bolden [I], to an at-
tempt to shut off dilution suits or, in the case of congressional revi-
sion of section 2, to an effort to lessen the evidentiary burdens on
plaintiffs bringing such suits. To the extent, however, that the
changes in section 2 produce the intended results, the number of
dilution actions will increase dramatically; and the courts will face
an ever increasing urge to resort to a more mechanistic standard
for evaluating dilution suits than is provided by the language of
section 2.230
229. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in Justice Douglas's dissenting views on the
dilution claim of Marion County blacks in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 177-79 (1971)
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the result in part).
230. Recent cases provide some insight into the combined impact of the Supreme Court's
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In fact, much of the opposition to the revision of section 2,
ruling in Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272 and the 1982 revision of section 2 on litigation against at-
large elections. On September 24, 1982, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on
Lodge, affirmed two district court decisions against local at-large systems. In McMillan v.
Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed under Rule 53, sub nom. City
of Pensacola v. Jenkins, 453 U.S. 946 (1981), vacated, 688 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1982), a three
judge panel vacated the Fifth Circuit's previous holding that the at-large election of the
County Commission violated neither consitutional nor statutory prohibitions against vote
dilution. Without reaching the claim that the at-large system violated the revised language
of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the court, citing Lodge, affirmed the district court's
finding of dilution, 688 F.2d at 961-62, n.2. For further discussion of this case, see supra text
accompanying notes 201-04. In Broussard v. Perez, 686 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1982), a separate
three judge panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that the at-large elec-
tion of the five member Commission Council of Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, violated the
fourteenth amendment. Id. A majority vote rule applied to the general election. No black
had ever been elected to the council in a parish with a population about one-fifth black in
1980. Id.
In Cross v. Baxter, 688 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1982), decided four days before the Escambia
County and Plaquemines Parish cases, a Fifth Circuit panel held that the contention of
black plaintiffs failed under either the Bolden [I] or Lodge standards set out by the Su-
preme Court; the panel affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit. Id. See supra note
141.
A very fresh case, decided principally on section 2 grounds rather than on the constitu-
tional grounds of Lodge, is Jones v. City of Lubbock, No. CA-5-76-34 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20,
1983). The district court was ruling on this action for a second time, having found vote
dilution on the basis of the Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1297, and Nevett II, 571 F.2d at 209,
standards in a 1979 ruling; the Fifth Circuit had reversed and remanded the decision in
light of the Supreme Court's Bolden [I] and Lodge decisions. Jones, slip op. at 1-3. See
Jones v. City of Lubbock, 640 F.2d 77 (1981), aff'd on rehearing, 682 F.2d 504 (5th Cir.
1982). In its second ruling, the district court found that the at-large election of Lubbock's
four member city council diluted the voting strength of black and Mexican-American voters
in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Blacks comprised 8.2 percent and Mexi-
can-Americans, 17.9 percent of Lubbock's population of 173,979. The court found a history
of discrimination, racially polarized voting, and a pattern of socioeconomic disparities hin-
dering minority political participation. No black or Mexican-American had ever been
elected to the council. The city government was judged responsive to minority interests and
the at-large system was not rooted in discriminatory intent. The at-large scheme utilized a
majority vote rule and a numbered post requirement. (Interestingly, a Mexican-American
candidate had been elected on an at-large basis to the city school board under a plurality
vote system. Jones, slip. op. at 11. The court's interpretation of section 2 is noteworthy since
it would suggest that the revision of section 2 has done more than "restore" the dilution
standard that governed federal courts prior to the Supreme Court's Bolden [I] ruling in
1980.
These changes, as enacted by the Congress of the United States, require a different
approach to the problem of at-large elections than that required prior to such amend-
ment or even that that was required by Zimmer and Nevett v. Sides.
Therefore, this court will analyze the evidence at both the first and second trials
and apply such evidence to the standards as indicated in the Committee Report of
the United States Senate. These standards are very similar to those set forth in Zim-
mer, but if there was any doubt prior to the amendment of the Voting Rights Act as
to whether or not discriminatory intention was required, that doubt has not been
finally removed. The removal of any requirement of discriminatory intent as an ele-
ment of recovery for violations of the fifteenth amendment or the Voting Rights Act
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within and outside Congress, came from persons who believe that
once the door is opened to litigation against at-large systems on a
results-test basis, the courts will slide inevitably toward a fixed,
measurable standard for assessing the discriminatory impact of at-
large elections. That standard, in the view of the opponents of
changes in section 2, will be proportional representa-
tion-notwithstanding the proviso against proportional representa-
tion in the new language of section 2. If proportional representa-
tion were to become the standard, of course, few at-large cities or
counties with sizable minority populations could survive judicial
scrutiny.
That the courts inevitably will push the legal concept of vote
dilution toward a precise and inflexible standard of proportional
representation may or may not be an unwarranted fear. Yet the
unavoidable ambiguity of standards for assessing dilution-the
cause of such fear-is a problem that is quite real. This problem
could be eliminated if federal courts were to hold unconstitutional
the use of percentage-determining devices such as numbered posts
or a majority vote rule when employed in conjunction with at-large
elections. 23' Indeed, it is such provisions that give at-large elec-
as amended requires a reevaluation of the evidence.
Jones, slip. op. at 4.
See Taylor v. Haywood County, 544 F. Supp. 1122 (W.D. Tenn. 1982), in which the at-
large elections of the Highway Commissioners were enjoined based on the likelihood that
the scheduled elections would violate black plaintiffs' rights under the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments and the 1982 revised language of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
Of special interest within Virginia is the settlement of the suit against the at-large elec-
tion of the seven member city council in Hopewell. Before trial, the city agreed to establish
a five-ward/two-at-large plan, to be phased in by 1986. Harris v. City of Hopewell, C.A. No.
82-0036-R (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 1983) (consent judgment). Hopewell had a 1980 population of
23,397 persons, of whom 19.9 percent were black. No black had been elected to Hopewell's
at-large council until 1981, after the suit had been filed. According to newspapers accounts,
Hopewell's settlement of the suit was influenced by its perception that it could not prevail
under the "results" test of the revised section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Gordon, Ward
Vote Defended by Hopewell Council, Rich.-Times Dispatch, Jan. 12, 1983, at B4. The suit
against Hopewell was the first successful action against an existing local at-large system in
Virginia.
See also Ketchum v. Byrne, No. 82C-4085 (N.D. M11. Dec. 21, 1982) (discussed in White,
Judge Rejects Chicago Remap, Orders Redrawing of 5 Wards, Chi. Tribune, Dec. 23, 1982,
§1, at 4).
231. This sort of approach is suggested by Justice Steven's dissenting opinion in Lodge.
See supra text accompanying notes 178-87. See also Concerning the Voting Rights Act,
1982: Hearings on S. 1992 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 12, 1982) (statement of James F. Blumstein,
Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Univ.) (as of March 1, 1983, this hearing had not been
published).
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tions, under such political and social conditions as prevail in Burke
County or Mobile, their peculiar exclusionary impact. A prohibi-
tion against percentage-determining devices could be grounded on
the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, as well as on section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act.2 32 An alternative to judicial invocation of
this approach would be congressional enactment of a national ban
on the use of percentage-determining devices in conjunction with
at-large elections or multimember districts. The legislative route
would be analogous to the nationwide ban on the literacy test, en-
acted by Congress in 1970 when it extended the Voting Rights Act
of 1965,233 which was upheld by the Supreme Court in Oregon v.
Mitchell.3 4
Shifting the focus of vote dilution claims away from at-large sys-
232. Litigation against such dilutive rules as majority vote requirements, numbered post
designations, full slate requirements, and staggered terms has occurred rather infrequently
and without much success. The relative success of suits against at-large elections per se
probably has discouraged the litigation of these rules, removal of which would still leave the
at-large system in place. See, e.g., Cherry v. County of New Hanover, 489 F.2d 273 (4th Cir.
1973) (claim that staggered terms of office for city and county governing bodies constituted
"invidious discrimination" against black voters rejected); Gordon v. Meeks, 394 F.2d 3 (5th
Cir. 1968) (percuriam) (challenge to full-slate rule for city council elections in Brimingham,
Alabama rejected); Jolley v. School Dist. No. 1, No. 78-880 (D.S.C. June 2, 1978) (suit dis-
missed against at-large system after school board agreed to abandon numbered post rule
and majority vote requirement) (discussed in UNFULFLLED GoALs, supra note 13, at 49-50);
Dunston v. Scott, 336 F. Supp. 206 (E.D.N.C. 1972) ("numbered seat law" and "anti-single
shot law" applicable to some, but not all, state legislative multimember districts in North
Carolina struck down by three-judge court on fourteenth amendment grounds based on une-
qual application of these statutes, rather than their racially dilutive potential); Stevenson v.
West, Civil No. 72-45 (D.S.C. April 7, 1972) (full-slate requirement struck down on non-
racial grounds but numbered post law for state legislative multimember districts in South
Carolina upheld) (discussed in TEN YEARS AFTER, supra note 13, at 215-16); Amedee v.
Fowler, 275 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. La. 1967) (per curiam) (following Boineau v. Thornton, claim
that full-slate law in Louisiana was racially discriminatory dismissed by three-judge court);
Boineau v. Thornton, 235 F. Supp. 175 (E.D.S.C. 1964) (Republican challenge to South Car-
olina statute mandating full-slate voting in multimember state legislative districts rejected
by three-judge court). See also Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875, 878 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979), dis-
cussed supra note 141.
Of related interest is the Supreme Court's December 13, 1982, decision in City of Port
Arthur v. United States, 51 U.S.L.W. 4033 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1982), af'g 517 F. Supp. 987
(D.D.C. 1981). Pursuant to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, Port Arthur sought a declara-
tory judgment for its 1977 consolidation with two other cities and a 1978 annexation. The
city proposed to neutralize the racially dilutive impact of its expansion (the black propor-
tion of its population had declined from 45.21 to 40.56 percent) by replacing its at-large
plan of election for city council with a mixed ward/at-large plan. The Supreme Court held
that the district court properly had conditioned approval of the mixed plan on the removal
of a majority vote requirement applicable to two non-mayoral at-large seats.
233. See supra note 17.
234. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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tems and targeting instead the discriminatory provisions that often
accompany at-large elections would clarify the scope of judicial
discretion in reviewing these suits; in the process, this approach
also would substantially accelerate the pace at which local electoral
systems impervious to minority influence are modified to ensure
political access to black and/or language minority groups. It should
be noted that nearly all of the successful suits against existing at-
large systems to date have involved electoral plans utilizing one or
more percentage-determining devices.13 5
An emphasis on percentage-determining devices would eliminate
many, if not all, of the theoretical and practical difficulties associ-
ated with remedying vote dilution in successful challenges to at-
large systems. As a rule, when a court finds an at-large system un-
constitutional, the judge imposes a remedy of single-member dis-
tricting in place of the offensive at-large plan. In special circum-
stances, a mixed ward/at-large plan may be a suitable remedy.2"'
235. But compare McIntosh County Branch of NAACP v. City of Darien, 605 F.2d 753,
756 (5th Cir. 1980), where the court reversed a district court's dismissal of a suit against the
four-member council in Darien, Georgia. Darien employed a plurality voting system, with
the four candidates receiving the largest number of votes taking office. Id. at 756. Interest-
ingly, there was some question in this case about whether city officials had told members of
the black community that single-shot voting was prohibited. Id. at 761. However, in Sonnier
v. Town of Vinton, 484 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. La. 1980), the district court, following McIntosh,
found no dilution in the at-large election of a mayor and five-member town council in a
town of 3,453 persons, 18 percent of whom were black (in 1970). A majority vote rule ap-
plied to an open primary, but single-shot voting was not prohibited. Id. at 155.
236. Where courts determine that at-large elections dilute minority voting strength, the
remedy lies in the substitution of a ward or mixed plan for the at-large scheme. Absent
special circumstances, apportionment plans created by federal courts must employ single-
member districts only. See, e.g., Wise v. Libscomb, 437 U.S. 535 (1978); Wallace v. House,
425 U.S. 947 (1976); and East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
Legislative plans, as opposed to court-fashioned plans are accorded more latitude in depart-
ing from the presumption in favor of single-member districts. See Wise, 437 U.S. 535. Cf.
McMillan v. Escambia County, 688 F.2d 960, 970-72 (5th Cir. 1982).
Even when a judicial finding of dilution in a challenge to an at-large system unquestion-
ably calls for the implementation of an all-ward plan, the usual remedy, there remains the
question of whether districts should be drawn in order to maximize the opportunity for a
racial or language minority to achieve proportional representation on the local governing
body. In short, should districting be race-conscious or race-neutral? As a practical matter,
the federal courts have not resolved the issue clearly. In Marshall v. Edwards, 582 F.2d 927
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 908 (1979), the court reviewed a district court's rem-
edy in the Zimmer case. The district court had accepted a plan submitted by East Carroll
Parish which presumably assured blacks proportional representation. 582 F.2d at 931. By
1976, blacks made up 60 percent of the parish population and 48 percent of its registered
voters. In effect, the plan assured four safe black seats and gave blacks a chance for a fifth
seat on the nine-member board. The Fifth Circuit panel interpreted the plan as court-or-
dered and rejected it on the grounds that proportional representation is not a proper goal of
a court-created plan. Id. at 934-37. But the panel's rejection of proportionality seemed to be
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The remedy of single-member districts raises two issues touching
on both law and policy. One question not clearly resolved by prior
case law is whether a ward remedy for an at-large scheme ought to
employ race as a criterion of districting so as to maximize the op-
portunity of a minority population to achieve proportional
representation.237
A more important issue, however, is whether the choice between
at-large and ward elections is purely a matter of electoral mechan-
ics. The first round of litigation in Bolden [I] provides an example
in which at-large elections were integral to the form of govern-
ment. Since city commissioners in Mobile performed both execu-
tive and legislative functions, election under a ward plan would
seem to be inappropriate. When the district court held against the
city's at-large plan, the city refused to submit a proposal for divid-
ing the city into wards under the commission plan. The city's view
that the commission plan and ward elections were incompatible.led
Judge Pittman in his remedy to call for the replacement of the
commission with a mayor-council form with ward elections. Justice
Blackmun concurred in the Supreme Court's Bolden [I] ruling
only because of this far-reaching remedy; he suggested that the
district court should have pursued less radical alternative remedies
within the framework of the commission plan, such as abandoning
the majority vote requirement or adopting a ward residency
requirement.2 3
While the commission plan poses an extreme case, in other
structures of municipal and county government, electoral form
may be intimately linked in theory and practice to the perceived
relationship between the legislative branch and executive branch.
based less on principle than on doubts about the particular sort of proportionality evidenced
in the plan. The panel noted that the plan provided for proportional representation of
blacks in terms of registered voters, but fell short of providing proportionality in terms of
population-the preferred measure in apportionment cases. Id. at 937. See also Wyche v.
Madison Parish Police Jury, 635 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1981).
In a related case decided in 1977, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals utilized the Zimmer
criteria to evaluate alternative plans for redistricting in an existing single-member system
and held that Zimmer did not permit race-neutral districting in localities where a racial
minority had been denied access to the political process. Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors,
554 F.2d 139 (1977). Judge Gee, specially concurring, lamented the court's apparent en-
dorsement of benign gerrymandering in order to guarantee proportional minority represen-
tation, although he believed that the Supreme Court's decision in United Jewish Organiza-
tions v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), required that ruling. 554 F.2d at 155 (Gee, J.,
concurring). See also United States v. Board of Supervisors, 571 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1978).
237. See supra note 236.
238. Bolden [I, 446 U.S. 55, 80-82 (1980).
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Certainly this is true of the council-manager plan of government,
under which at-large elections are the rule.39 Of course, it is of no
small import that two-thirds of American cities, according to a
1981 survey, elected city councils on an at-large basis.240
V. CONCLUSION
Whether the approach to dilution claims discussed here would
provide adequate relief to the perceived evil of discrimination
against minority voters in at-large systems is an open question. To
the extent at-large voting itself, rather than one or more percent-
age-determining devices, is the principal vehicle through which
white bloc voting can effectively foreclose minority political influ-
ence, an approach focused on such devices would be misplaced.
That at-large elections are the primary impediment to minority in-
fluence, however, has not been demonstrated convincingly.
241
239. See R. CHILDS, Civic VicTORIEs: THE STORY OF AN UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 141-44,
178-80 (1952); NATIONAL MUNIcIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL CITY CHARTER 14-15 (6th ed. 1964). A
number of scholars have pointed out that Progressives of the early twentieth century viewed
municipal reforms, particularly at-large elections, as mechanisms for reducing the influence
of low income whites and blacks. See Davidson & Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority
Representation: A Re-Examination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence, 43 J. POL.
982, 985-92 (1981). The board outlines of the Progressive Model (at-large, non-partisan elec-
tions, council-manager government) can be divorced, however, from the particular motives
of its proponents in certain cities at specific points in time. The essential elements of the
model ought to be distinguished from the not-so-subtle devices of discrimination (such as
anti-single shot rules) that may be grafted on the model. Indeed, Childs, whose career as a
reformer spanned the short ballot movement and the "reapportionment revolution," makes
a case for proportional representation. CHILDS, supra this note, at 242-51.
240. Sanders, Government of American Cities: Continuity and Change in Structure,
1982 The Municipal Year Book 180 (Washington, D.C.: Int'l City Management Ass'n).
241. Davidson & Korbel, supra note 239, at 992-98, summarize thirteen studies of the
impact of ward and at-large elections on minority representation. While these studies, on
balance, show that blacks achieve greater representation relative to population under ward-
elected local governing bodies than under at-large plans, few if any of these studies attempt
to sort out the effects of at-large systems with and without single shot rules. Cf. MacManus,
City Council Election Procedures and Minority Representation: Are They Related?, 59
Soc. Sc. Q. 153, 157 (1978). Davidson and Korbel assess the impact of a change from at-
large (or multimember) representation to mixed or ward representation in 21 cities, 12 state
legislative districts, and 8 education districts in Texas over the 1970-1979 period. Their re-
sults show fairly dramatic gains in black and Hispanic representation as a result of the
changes, most of which were the result of section 5 objections or dilution suits. However,
they point out "several cases had place voting before the change... [and thus] our findings
are best interpreted as demonstrating the dilutionary effect of these two processes operating
simultaneously." Davidson & Korbel, supra note 239, at 999 n.64. This author is not sug-
gesting that minority groups would fare as well under ward or mixed plans. Rather, he is
suggesting that the exclusionary characteristics of at-large elections in some cities (such that
a racial minority can be effectively precluded from influencing electoral outcomes) may be
largely if not wholly attributable to such mechanisms.
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Moreover, the all-or-nothing approach of Zimmer, Nevett H, and
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act-according to which an at-large
system survives legal challenge or is replaced by a ward
plan-would appear to be a cumbersome, time-consuming, and ex-
pensive strategy for assailing discriminatory systems. The
problems of unbridled judicial discretion under a Zimmer-linked
results test or under an intent test are genuine. Plainly, there is
need for the courts or Congress to chart a course out of or through
what has become a most muddled area of law.
Some support for this view is provided by Butler, Election Structures, supra note 12,
which examined nationwide the impact of alternative electoral systems on the election of
blacks in cities with a population of 5,000 or more persons and with a black population of at
least 20 percent. For the four Deep South states-Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
South Carolina-Butler found that one or more blacks were on councils in 92 percent of the
ward cities and in only 29 percent of the at-large cities in 1981. Blacks had been elected to
half of the at-large city councils in Louisiana (there were only four cities), 18 percent in
Mississippi, 36 percent in South Carolina, and 19 percent in Alabama. Butler comments:
Although additional information is needed to determine whether electing and non-
electing at-large municipalities in these states can be distinguished on the basis of
differences in their use of percentage-determining devices, some tentative observa-
tions can be made. Except for Louisiana, South Carolina has the greatest percentage
of electing at-large municipalities, followed by Alabama and finally Mississippi. Mis-
sissippi has a full slate requirement and numbered posts are prevalent in Alabama.
Alabama and Mississippi have non-partisan elections and both require candidates to
receive a majority to win without a runoff. On the other hand, South Carolina has
neither a full slate nor a post requirement. South Carolina municipalities may choose
between partisan and non-partisan elections, and a majority vote requirement is
optional.
Id. at 873 (footnotes omitted).
Butler also found that blacks were less likely to be elected in at-large cities in the South
(which includes the four states noted plus Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas,
and Virginia) than in at-large cities in other regions of the country. Id. at 872. Since per-
centage-determining rules such as majority vote or full-slate requirements are far less com-
mon outside the South, the use of such rules may contribute significantly to the exclusion-
ary characteristics of at-large elections in the South. Butler suggests that the level of racial
bloc voting is probably much higher in the South than elsewhere and that this may account
for the particularly strong dilutive impact of at-large elections in southern states. Id. at 875.
In contrast to the pattern Butler found in the four Deep South states, at-large cities in
Virginia typically do have one or more blacks on councils. In 1981, blacks sat on councils in
15 of the 18 at-large cities with a black population of at least 15 percent. Virginia's at-large
cities, however, utilize a simple plurality vote system, with staggered terms being the only
percentage-determining rule in wide use. See O'Rourke, The Voting Rights Act Amend-
ments of 1982: The New Bailout and Virginia, 69 VA. L. REV. - (1983) (forthcoming).
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ADDENDUM
In companion cases decided in September, 1982, a district court
rejected on all grounds, including the revised language of Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act, a vote dilution claim against the at-large
election of the Board of Education and the County Commission of
Dallas County, Alabama.1 Of particular interest in these decisions
is Chief Judge Hand's extensive comparative analysis of the dilu-
tion standards established by prior cases in the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals and in the United States Supreme Court, and by the
results test of the revised section 2.2
1. United States v. Dallas County Comm'n [I], 548 F. Supp. 794 (S.D. Ala. 1982) (school
board); United States v. Dallas County Comm'n [I1], 548 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Ala. 1982)
(commission).
The five members of the school board were elected to numbered posts for staggered
terms and a majority vote rule applied to party primaries. Dallas County Comm'n [1], 548
F. Supp. at 800. The five commission members, including the judge of probate, were elected
concurrently to specific posts with a majority vote rule applicable to the party primaries.
Dallas County Comm'n [i], 548 F. Supp. at 881-82. Blacks comprised 44 percent of the
voting age population of Dallas County in 1976 and 44 percent of registered voters in 1976.
Dallas County Comm'n [I], 548 F. Supp. at 842; Dallas County Comm'n [II], 548 F. Supp.
at 887. No black had been elected to any county-wide office in modern times. Dallas County
Comm'n [II], 548 F. Supp. at 887; Dallas County Comm'n [I], 548 F. Supp. at 842; but see
id. at 799 n.4a.
2. Dallas County Comm'n [71, 548 F. Supp. at 862-69; Dallas County Comm'n [i], 548 F.
Supp. at 914-19. The court discussed Rogers v. Lodge, - U.S. - 102 S. Ct. 3272
(1982); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 466 U.S. 55 (1980); Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358 (5th
Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nor. Rogers v. Lodge, - U.S. - , 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982); Kirksey v.
Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977); Zim-
mer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
In holding against the plaintiff in both cases, Chief Judge Hand attached great weight
to the responsiveness of county officials to the interests of black citizens in Dallas. Cf. S.
REP. No. 97-417, supra note 21, at 29 n.116.
